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TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY 
AND SELF-REGULATION OF HEALTH 
CARE SERVICES: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK AND THE SWINOMISH 
TRIBE’S DENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM 
GEOFFREY D. STROMMER, STARLA K. ROELS, AND CAROLINE P. MAYHEW* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, an important shift is taking place in the Indian 
health care arena. Over the past forty years, many American Indian Tribes have 
transitioned away from relying primarily on federal officials to provide a bare 
minimum in health care services to Indian people and have begun instead to de-
velop and operate complex tribal health care delivery systems that offer the high-
est level of health care possible.1 Health care has historically been considered, 
and remains today, a core component of the federal trust responsibility to Indi-
ans.2 However, that trust responsibility is increasingly being carried out through 
the transfer of resources and authority from federal agencies to Tribes to assume 
control and responsibility to design, implement, and provide direct programs and 
services that are better tailored to local tribal needs.3 This federal policy of sup-
porting tribal sovereignty and tribal self-determination generally has indeed fos-
tered and encouraged the development of a new, robust tribal health care system.4 
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1. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 2. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 3. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 4. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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To date, this new health care system has largely developed and evolved 
within the framework of existing federal health care and Indian law.5 More re-
cently, some Tribes have begun to use their inherent tribal sovereign authority to 
innovate and expand the services they provide to Indian people beyond the ser-
vices that might otherwise be available under state or federal law.6 This article 
will examine the historical backdrop against which the modern Indian health sys-
tem has developed; describe the current legal framework that allows tribes to 
exercise tribal sovereign authority to provide and regulate health care services 
under tribal law; and discuss—as a concrete example—how these legal authori-
ties have been used to make available much needed dental care to Indians who 
reside near the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community in Washington State.  
II. HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
A. Origins of the Federal Responsibility for Indian Health Care  
In permanently reauthorizing the Indian Health Care Improvement Act in 
2010,7 Congress cited the federal government’s need to fulfill its “special trust 
responsibilities and legal obligations to Indians”8 and declared that “Federal 
health services to maintain and improve the health of the Indians are consonant 
with and required by the Federal Government’s historical and unique legal rela-
tionship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”9 The 
trust responsibilities and legal obligations cited by Congress reflect the dual con-
cepts of federal supremacy over Indian affairs and a general federal-tribal “trust 
relationship” that together provide the legal, moral, and political justification for 
numerous federal services and programs for Indians, from education to housing 
to health care to many others.10 The roots of the federal trust duty can be traced 
 
 5. See discussion infra Sections II.C, IV. 
 6. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat. 119, 935–
36 (2010) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 8. S. Res. 1790, 111th Cong. § 103 (2009) (enacted). 
 9. Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 (1976) (cod-
ified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 10. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 2016) (“It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the 
Federal Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian peo-
ple for the education of Indian children.”); 25 U.S.C. § 4101(2), (4) (Supp. IV 2016) (“[T]here exists a 
unique relationship between the Government of the United States and the governments of Indian tribes 
and a unique Federal responsibility to Indian people . . . the Congress, through treaties, statutes, and the 
general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed a trust responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of Indian tribes and for working with tribes and their members to improve their housing 
conditions and socioeconomic status so that they are able to take greater responsibility for their own eco-
nomic condition . . . .’”); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)–(3) (Supp. IV 2016) (“Congress, through statutes, treaties, 
and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and 
  
2018] TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY 117 
 
to treaties, statutes, and judicial decisions from the earliest days of the Republic, 
and, along with the notion of plenary and exclusive federal power, has evolved 
to become one of the bedrock principles of our modern federal Indian policy.11 
Another of these bedrock principles is the federal acknowledgment of retained 
inherent tribal sovereignty and the resulting right of tribes to exercise sovereign 
authority over their own lands and people.12  
Before the United States Constitution was even adopted, the Confederation 
Congress outlined an early vision of United States Indian policy in the Northwest 
Ordinance, which established a government and certain laws for the newly cre-
ated Northwest Territory.13 The Northwest Ordinance called for “[t]he utmost 
good faith” toward Indians and respect for their land and property rights; af-
firmed that their “rights, property, and liberty” should not be disturbed; and de-
clared that “laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be 
made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and 
friendship with them.”14 Though not always borne out in practice, as the often 
gruesome history of the United States shows, this sentiment nevertheless sowed 
the early seeds of a consistently acknowledged (if aspirational) feature of our 
federal Indian policy: a good faith duty, with both moral and legal dimensions, 
toward Indian peoples as such that includes the recognition of tribal authority 
and self-determination.15  
Two months after the Northwest Ordinance was enacted by the Continental 
Congress, the United States Constitution was signed. That document lay the 
 
preservation of Indian tribes and their resources . . . there is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, 
as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian 
tribe . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 3701(2) (Supp. IV 2016) (“[T]he United States has a trust responsibility to pro-
tect, conserve, utilize, and manage Indian agricultural lands consistent with its fiduciary obligation and its 
unique relationship with Indian tribes . . . .”).   
 11. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.02[1], [2], 5.04[3][a] (Nell Jessup Newton 
et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (explaining that “courts have recognized that Con-
gress has ‘plenary and exclusive authority’ over Indian affairs” and have defined the trust relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes). 
 12. Id. § 4.01[1][a] (explaining that the “Constitution, legislation, treaties, judicial decisions, and 
administrative practice” all recognize the inherent “tribal powers of self-government”).  
 13. 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787 334–43 (July 13, 1787) (GPO 1936). 
 14. Id. at 340–41 (“The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands 
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and 
liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; 
but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being 
done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.”).   
 15. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 4.01[1][a] (“Perhaps the most basic principle of all 
Indian law, supported by a host of [legal] decisions, is that those powers vested in an Indian nation are 
not, in general, delegated power granted by express acts of Congress, but rather ‘inherent powers of a 
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’” (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313, 322–23 (1978))). 
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foundation for a continuing government-to-government relationship between In-
dian tribes and the United States by recognizing tribes as separate sovereigns and 
by vesting exclusive authority over Indian affairs with the federal government 
(as opposed to the states). Specifically, the Indian Commerce Clause grants Con-
gress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”16 As its first order of business in 
exercising its new powers over Indian affairs, the First Congress enacted the 
Nonintercourse Act in 1790, forbidding any person from carrying on “any trade 
or intercourse with the Indian tribes, without a license for that purpose” and pro-
hibiting the purchase of lands from Indians or tribes without the consent of the 
United States.17 Congress’ early decision under its Indian commerce clause pow-
ers to deal with Indians at the tribal level, and on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis, 
was a significant one in the development of a national Indian policy.18  
Congress’ acknowledgment of the government-to-government nature of In-
dian affairs followed naturally from the practice of treatymaking with Indian 
tribes, which had begun during colonial times.19 After the Constitution was in 
place, the new federal government continued to enter into bilateral treaties with 
individual Indian tribes pursuant to the Article II Treaty Clause.20 At the same 
time, general and specific promises made in those treaties helped to shape the 
young Congress’ view of its responsibilities to Indian tribes on a national level.21 
In many treaties, the United States agreed to take tribes under its “protection” 
and to provide annuities or payments, goods and supplies, and various health and 
educational services or resources in exchange for settlement rights to vast quan-
tities of land and commitments of peace.22 In a 1957 report to Congress, the Pub-
lic Health Service (PHS) noted:  
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
 17. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 137–38 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (Supp. 
IV 2016)).  
 18. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 170–72 (2008). 
 19. See The Avalon Project, Treaties Between the United States and Native Americans, YALE L. 
SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/ntreaty.asp (last updated 2008), for a list of treaties be-
ginning from 1778. 
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make treaties with the 
advice and consent of the Senate). 
 21. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.03[2] (“Each substantive provision of the 
first Trade and Intercourse Act fulfilled an obligation previously assumed by the United States in treaties 
with various tribes.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations, preamble, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, 15 (“The United States 
of America give peace to the Seneca’s, Mohawks, Onondagas and Cayugas, and receive them into their 
protection . . . .”); Treaty with the Miamies, arts. 1, 6, Miamies-U.S., Oct. 23, 1826, 7 Stat. 300, 300–01 
(“The United States agree to appropriate the sum of two thousand dollars annually, as long as Congress 
may think proper, for the support of poor infirm persons of the Miami tribe, and for the education of the 
youth of the said tribe; which sum shall be expended under the direction of the President of the United 
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By 1871, when Congress terminated treaty-making, at least 2 dozen 
treaties had provided for some kind of medical service, including an 
occasional hospital. Although most of the treaties imposed time limits 
of 5 to 20 years on the provision of care, the Federal Government 
adopted a policy of continuing services under so-called ‘gratuity ap-
propriations’ after the original benefit period expired.23  
The origins of many of the federal service programs for Indians today, including 
health care programs for Indians, can thus be traced to these treaty promises.24  
The concepts of the federal trust responsibility and exclusive federal au-
thority over Indian affairs (including the federal provision to Indians of goods 
and services like health care), have thus been consistently acknowledged in the 
laws and policies of the United States in some form, although that form has 
evolved over time. This is perhaps most starkly apparent in historical decisions 
of the Supreme Court, which has been credited as the first federal body to ex-
plicitly identify a trust responsibility as such. The Court’s early framing of the 
federal-tribal relationship was overtly paternalistic and patronizing but recog-
nized both that the federal government owed a special duty of protection to In-
dian people by virtue of its relationship and dealings with them and that states 
lacked governing authority over Indian territory. In a case often cited as the ear-
liest explicit recognition of a trust responsibility, Chief Justice John Marshall in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia described Indian tribes as “domestic dependent na-
tions” under the protection of the United States and whose “relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”25 In a follow-up case, Worcester 
 
States.”); Treaty with the Winnebagoes, arts. I, IV–V, U.S.-Winnebago, Sept. 15, 1832, 7 Stat. 370, 370–
72 (promising to construct a school and provide for the education of children, including clothing, board 
and lodging; funds for agriculturalists, oxen, ploughs, and other agricultural implements; and “for the 
services and attendance of a physician at Prairie du Chien, and of one at Fort Winnebago, each, two hun-
dred dollars, per annum,” among other items); Treaty with the Ottawas and Chippewas, arts. 1, 4, Mar. 
28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491, 491–92 (promising “[t]hree hundred dollars per annum for vaccine matter, medi-
cines, and the services of physicians, to be continued while the Indians remain on their reservations.”); 
Treaty with the Flatheads, etc., arts. I, V, Flatheads-U.S., July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975, 975–77 (promising 
to erect a hospital, among other things, “keeping the same in repair, and provided with the necessary 
medicines and furniture, and to employ a physician” for a period of 20 years); Treaty with the Klamath, 
etc., arts. I, IV, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 707–09 (promising to erect and maintain a school and hospital 
on the reservation for a period of twenty years); Treaty of Fort Laramie, arts. I, XIII, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 
Stat. 635, 635–40 (“The United States hereby agrees to furnish annually to the Indians the physician, 
teachers, carpenter, miller, engineer, farmer, and blacksmiths, as herein contemplated, and that such ap-
propriations shall be made from time to time, on the estimate of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be 
sufficient to employ such persons.”).  
 23. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 86–87 (1957).  
 24. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.03[1]; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Supp. IV 2016) (“Con-
gress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the 
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources[.]”). 
 25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).  Later, in United States v. Kagama, the Su-
preme Court opined:  
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v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall held that the state of Georgia could not en-
force its criminal laws against non-Indians residing in Cherokee territory, writ-
ing: 
 The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws 
of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have 
no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or 
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our con-
stitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.26 
The Supreme Court now recognizes greater state authority within Indian 
country, particularly over non-Indians, but federal supremacy in the realm of In-
dian affairs and inherent tribal sovereign authority are still the law of the land.27 
Additionally, over time, the federal trust responsibility has come to be recognized 
as a general fiduciary duty, with the relationship compared to one between a 
trustee and its beneficiary rather than a guardian and its ward, arising not because 
Indian people cannot care for themselves but because the nature and history of 
the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes created certain 
ongoing obligations. This federal view of the trust relationship and the federal 
power that accompanies it has evolved through and is reflected in judicial deci-
sions, Acts of Congress, and Executive Orders and other policies that, 
acknowledge the special status of Indian tribes within our federal system and 
establish a range of programs and services for Indians.28  
 
From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the fed-
eral government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty 
of protection, and with it the power.  This has always been recognized by the executive, and 
by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen. 
118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).   
 26. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
 27. See infra Section III.A.  Federal supremacy over Indian affairs does not mean that the states do 
not retain the obligation to protect the equal rights of, and provide state services to, Indian people who are 
also state residents or citizens, to the same extent as all other state residents or citizens.  See COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 14.02[2][d][iv] (citing cases holding that states may not deny Indians state 
services on the grounds that federal services are available as an alternative).  Indeed, as part of the IHCIA 
reauthorization in 2010 Congress codified a “payor of last resort” provision to ensure that other federal, 
state, and local programs remain responsible for payment for services provided by the Indian Health Ser-
vice and tribal health programs where those other federal, state, and local programs would otherwise pay 
for an individual’s care.  25 U.S.C. § 1623(b) (Supp. IV 2016).  
 28. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mitchell 
(Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)); see supra note 10 (listing federal statutes invoking the federal 
trust responsibility); Executive Order No. 13175 of November 6, 2000: Consultation and Coordination 
With Indian Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Press Release, The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Nov. 5, 
2009).  In 2012, the Supreme Court noted that while the federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes is not 
the same as a private trust enforceable under the common law, “The Government, following ‘a humane 
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B. The Evolution of Federal Indian Health Care Programs and Responsibilities 
The obligation to provide for Indian health has long been viewed by federal 
policymakers as a necessary component of the federal trust responsibility.29 It 
has also been viewed as a moral imperative, as well as a public health necessity, 
owing to the introduction of devastating new diseases and other consequences of 
colonialism with harmful impacts on Indian health. It was these latter concerns 
that drove the earliest appropriations of funding specifically for Indian health 
care, while the former began to take root and became more firmly entrenched 
over time. In its comprehensive 1957 report to Congress on the administration of 
Indian health services, the PHS noted that “[a]s early as 1802 or 1803, Army 
physicians took emergency measures to curb smallpox and other contagious dis-
eases among Indian tribes in the vicinity of military posts. Without doubt, these 
measures were intended primarily to protect soldiers at the forts from infection, 
but Indians benefitted.”30 In 1832, Congress directed the Secretary of War to 
employ physicians to administer smallpox vaccines to Indians.31  
In 1849, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred from the War 
Department to the Department of the Interior, the responsibility to provide for 
Indian health care was transferred along with it.32 The transfer resulted in some 
increase in the scope of Indian health care services beyond emergency vaccina-
tions and fulfillment of specific treaty promises. However, Indian health contin-
ued to be funded through patchwork legislation and from miscellaneous funds, 
and the modest increase in resources that accompanied the transfer proved inad-
equate to the task of ensuring minimum standards of health among Indian peo-
ple.33 As the PHS reported in its 1957 Report, “In 1892, Commissioner [of Indian 
Affairs Thomas J.] Morgan, having repeatedly exhorted Congress ‘in the name 
of humanity’ to provide money for Indian hospitals at every agency and boarding 
school, described the lack of such facilities as ‘a great evil, which in my view 
amounts to a national disgrace.’”34 
 
and self imposed policy . . . has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and 
trust,’ . . . obligations ‘to the fulfillment of which the national honor has been committed . . . .’”  United 
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,  564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) (internal citations omitted) (citing Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–297 (1942)); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 
(1912)).  Thus, the trust relationship and its general obligations extend across the federal government to 
include every member of the legislative and executive branches, though whether any particular responsi-
bilities enforceable as a matter of federal law exist is dependent on the context.   
 29. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.  
 30. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 86 (1957). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 87; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14 (1976). 
 34. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 87 (1957). 
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Congress began appropriating general funds for Indian health care in fiscal 
year 1911.35 Two years later, President Taft addressed Congress, citing a series 
of surveys that revealed shockingly high rates of disease among Indians and ask-
ing Congress to increase funding for Indian health care.36 President Taft charac-
terized his request as a requirement of the federal government’s special respon-
sibilities to Indian tribes, stating: “As guardians of the welfare of the Indians, it 
is our immediate duty to give to the race a fair chance for an unmaimed birth, 
healthy childhood, and physically efficient maturity.”37 Congress did increase 
the annual appropriations for Indian Health, and in 1921 passed the Snyder Act, 
authorizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to carry out programs “[f]or the relief 
of distress and conservation of health[,]” among other purposes.38 The Snyder 
Act provided the first statutory authorization for Indian health care programs, 
though the established programs were discretionary and appropriations levels 
were left for Congress to determine on an annual basis.39 
In 1928, a comprehensive survey of the economic and social state of Indians 
within the United States, known as the Meriam Report, revealed that the health 
status of Indian people remained extremely poor.40 The Meriam Report blamed 
inadequate appropriations for the lack of effectiveness of the Indian Service in 
addressing Indian health care, among other issues.41 At that time, however, In-
dian policy favored the assimilation of Indians into the general population and 
the eventual dissolution of Indian tribes as distinct political and cultural groups.42 
A larger focus was therefore put on integrating Indians into the public health 
system in the states and local communities where they resided. For example, in 
1934, Congress passed the Johnson O’Malley Act, authorizing the Bureau of In-
dian Affairs to enter into agreements with states and their political subdivisions 
to provide various social services including “medical attention” and “relief of 
 
 35. Act of Apr. 4, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-114, 36 Stat. 269; U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH 
SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957). 
 36. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 22.04[1] (quoting Diseases Among Indians, S. DOC. NO. 
62-907, at 2 (2d Sess. 1911)).  
 37. Id. 
 38. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. IV 2016).  
 39. Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How to Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy, and Frame-
work of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 376–77 (1996) (describing how the Snyder Act 
authorized Congress to control funding and discretionary programs for the benefit and care of Indian 
health). 
 40. LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., INST. FOR GOV’T RES., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 189 
(F. W. Powell ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1928). 
 41. Id. at 189.  
 42. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.06[1]. 
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distress.”43 Nevertheless, the Meriam Report recognized the unique federal re-
sponsibility to Indian tribes and urged caution in the transition of service admin-
istration, stating as a fundamental principle: 
[U]nder the Constitution of the United States and in accordance with 
the historical development of the country, the function of providing 
for Indians is the responsibility of the national government. . . . [T]he 
national government should not transfer activities incident to this 
function to individual states unless and until a particular state is pre-
pared to conduct that activity in accordance with standards at least as 
high as those adopted by the national government.44 
The assimilationist tone of federal Indian policy continued into the 1950s, 
despite passage of the landmark Indian Reorganization Act in 1934,45 which gen-
erally encouraged the organization of tribal governments and the exercise of 
greater tribal self-government. Regardless, the responsibility to provide health 
care to Indians was never in fact shifted from the federal government to the states. 
Rather, in 1954 Congress enacted legislation transferring the responsibility for 
Indian health services to the Public Health Service, a proposal that had been 
made some decades earlier but never acted upon.46 The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
had been relying on Public Health Service officers to assist in administering In-
dian health programs since 1926, and the transfer was intended in part to secure 
better resources and more qualified staff.47 The Division of Indian Health was 
thus created in the Public Health Service, under the U.S. Surgeon General.48  
By 1955, the Indian health appropriation had grown to nearly $18 million,49 
a dramatic increase from the $40,000 appropriated in 1911, and the Division of 
 
 43. Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 147, § 1, 48 Stat. 596, 596 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 5342 (Supp. IV 2016)).  The provision of health care services under the Johnson O’Malley Act was 
limited by the fact that many Indians still lived in areas where local health services were simply not avail-
able.  U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 92 (1957). 
 44. MERIAM ET AL., supra note 40, at 98.   
 45. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 567, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016); see Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 39, at 380–84, 395 (de-
scribing how the Government’s assimilationist tone towards tribes continued in federal policy, particularly 
in health policy, into the 1950s and in turn encouraged the organization of tribal governments).  
 46. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., INDIAN HEALTH SERV., INDIAN HEALTH MANUAL, 
Part 1-3.1, https://www.ihs.gov/IHM/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_pc_p1c3#1-3.1B (last visited July 14, 
2018) (indicating that proposals were made as early as 1919); Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 83-568, § 1, 68 
Stat. 674, 674 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2001 (Supp. IV 2016)) (“All functions, respon-
sibilities, authorities, and duties . . . relating to the maintenance and operation of hospital and health facil-
ities for Indians, and conservation of the health of Indians, are hereby transferred to, and shall be admin-
istered by, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, under the supervision and 
direction of the Secretary of Health, and Human Services . . . .”).  
 47. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 22.04[1]; Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 39, at 382.  
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 49. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957). 
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Indian Health administered a $24.5 million total budget.50 However, the Division 
reported to Congress that the funding was still insufficient: “Especially in recent 
years, rising medical costs and contraction in the value of the dollar, not to men-
tion increased utilization of services by the Indians, have largely offset increases 
in appropriations.”51  
The tenor of Indian policy changed markedly in the 1960s. The “Termina-
tion” policy of the 1950s was repudiated, and a new era of tribal self-determina-
tion took its place.52 By 1976, as Congress considered draft legislation that would 
become the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, the Indian Health Service an-
nual budget had grown to $274 million.53 Still, the poor state of Indian health 
was appalling, and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted 
that Indians and Alaska Natives “suffer a health status far below that of the gen-
eral population[.]”54 The Committee Report also stated that “any effort to fulfill 
Federal responsibilities to the Indian people must begin with the provision of 
health services.”55 Congress affirmed that view in enacting the IHCIA for the 
first time later that year, finding: “Federal health services to maintain and im-
prove the health of the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal 
Government’s historical and unique legal relationship with, and resulting respon-
sibility to, the American Indian people.”56  
C. The Modern Federal Legal Framework for Indian Health Care  
Enactment of the IHCIA marked a major turning point in the provision of 
federal health care services to Indian people. Though rooted in the same broad 
trust responsibility as earlier acts of Congress, the IHCIA was the first federal 
legislation to enact specific statutory programs for Indian health care. The com-
prehensive reform measures included in the IHCIA were designed to address a 
slew of problems identified and viewed by Congress as impediments to a better 
health status for Indian people as a whole, including: “inadequate, outdated, in-
efficient, and undermanned facilities”; “shortage of personnel”; “insufficient ser-
vices in such areas as laboratory, hospital inpatient and outpatient, eye care and 
mental health services, and services available through contracts with private phy-
 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14 (1976).  
 51. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957). 
 52. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.07.  
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14. The “Division of Indian Health” was retitled the “Indian 
Health Service” in 1968, and that title remains today.  Id.   
 54. Id. at 15. 
 55. Id. at 13.  
 56. Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 (1976) (cod-
ified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
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sicians, clinics, and agencies”; “related support factors”; “lack of access of Indi-
ans to health services due to remote residences, undeveloped or underdeveloped 
communication and transportation systems, and difficult, sometimes severe, cli-
mate conditions”; and “lack of safe water and sanitary waste disposal services.”57 
In order to address the staffing shortage in Indian health facilities, Title I of 
the IHCIA created grant and scholarship programs to encourage Indians to enter 
the health profession and to recruit health care professionals into the Indian 
health care system.58 Title II also authorized additional staffing positions and 
funding for direct and indirect patient care, field health, dental care, mental 
health, substance abuse, training, maintenance, and more.59 To address “inade-
quate, outdated, inefficient, and undermanned facilities” within the system, Title 
III authorized appropriations for the construction and renovation of hospitals, 
health centers, health stations, and staff housing.60 Title III also authorized fund-
ing to “supply unmet needs for safe water and sanitary waste disposal facilities 
in existing and new Indian homes and communities.”61 In addition, Title V of the 
IHCIA authorized the Secretary to enter into contracts with urban Indian organ-
izations to establish programs “to make health services more accessible to the 
urban Indian population.”62  
The IHCIA also helped Tribes and the IHS to leverage existing federal re-
sources to increase access to health care for Indians. Section 401 of the IHCIA, 
for example, added Section 1880 of the Social Security Act to permit IHS hos-
pitals (including those operated by Indian tribes) to collect Medicare reimburse-
ment.63 Importantly, Section 401 specified that any Medicare payments received 
under the new Section 1880 “shall not be considered in determining appropria-
tions for health care and services to Indians.”64 Section 402 of the IHCIA simi-
larly added Section 1911 of the Social Security Act, making IHS and tribal health 
facilities eligible to collect Medicaid reimbursements,65 and amended Section 
1905 of the Social Security Act to apply a 100 per centum Federal medical as-
sistance percentage “with respect to amounts expended as medical assistance for 
services which are received through an Indian Health Service facility whether 
 
 57. Id. § 2(f), 90 Stat. at 1400–01 (stating multiple factors determined by Congress that imperil Indian 
health).   
 58. Id. § 103, 90 Stat. at 1403 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1613 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 59. Id. § 201(a), (c), 90 Stat. at 1404–06 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1621 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 60. Id. § 301, 90 Stat. at 1406–07 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 61. Id. § 302, 90 Stat. at 1406–07 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1632 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 62. Id. § 501, 90 Stat. at 1410 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 63. Id. § 401, 90 Stat. at 1408–09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395qq (Supp. IV 2016)). 
 64. Id.   
 65. Id. § 402(a), 90 Stat. at 1409–10 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396j (Supp. IV 2016)).   
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operated by the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe or tribal organiza-
tion[.]”66  
Overall, the IHCIA was designed to “authorize a sustained and coordinated 
Federal health effort” to “establish a firm foundation upon which a continuous 
program capable of meeting the total health needs of the Indian and Alaska Na-
tive people could be maintained[.]”67 However, the goal was not only to increase 
the “quantity and quality of health services” available to Indians, but also to “en-
courage the maximum participation of Indians in the planning and management 
of those services.”68 In this way, the IHCIA was also a reflection of the burgeon-
ing federal policy of tribal self-determination, the cornerstone of which is the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), enacted in 
1975, just one year prior to the IHCIA.69  
The ISDEAA, also known by its Public Law number, 93-638, was intended 
to promote Indian self-determination by increasing tribal control over services 
provided to tribal members.70 In order to achieve that goal, the ISDEAA allows 
tribes to take over federal programs for Indians (including health programs) by 
contracting with the federal government to carry them out, “[i]n effect . . . 
step[ping] into the shoes of the federal [agencies]” that formerly provided those 
programs and services.71 This has the effect of allowing tribes to build the capac-
 
 66. Id. § 402(e), 90 Stat. at 1410 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (Supp. IV 2016)).   
 67. S. REP. NO. 94-133, at 13–14 (1975). It should be noted, however, that the IHCIA did not appro-
priate funding, so the implementation of its various provisions is still dependent on annual discretionary 
appropriations by Congress.  
 68. § 2(b), 90 Stat. at 1400 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)) (stating that a 
major national goal was to “permit the health status of Indians to be raised to the highest possible level”).  
 69. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203 
(1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016)).   
 70. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600, at 1, 6–7 (1974) (describing the many purposes of the ISDEAA, 
including to promote Indian participation in the government and education, provide for the full participa-
tion of Indian tribes in federal government programs and services, and to establish programs whereby 
Indian citizens can control education and youth intern programs).  The legislative goals of the ISDEAA 
are also summarized as follows in the Act’s Congressional declaration of Policy:   
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government’s unique and 
continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people 
as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will 
permit an orderly transition from federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to 
effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and admin-
istration of those programs and services.  In accordance with this policy, the United States is com-
mitted to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal gov-
ernments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their 
respective communities. 
25 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 71. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-
Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
1, 21 (2015) 
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ity to perform essential governmental functions as well as to improve the pro-
grams themselves by making them more responsive to local tribal needs.72 Over 
the years the ISDEAA has had a profound impact on the delivery of health care 
services to Indian people.  
The tribal assumption of federal programs under the ISDEAA began with 
self-determination contracting under Title I.73 Though Congress was forced to 
enact several amendments to the ISDEAA to address deep-seated agency re-
sistance to handing over its federal authority and associated funding to tribes,74 
Title I contracting nevertheless showed immediate promise. Title I gives all fed-
erally recognized Indian tribes and eligible tribal organizations the right to con-
tract for funds and responsibilities for programs provided to Indians by either the 
Department of the Interior or the Department of Health and Human Services,75 
and restricts the agencies’ ability to decline a contract proposal except where 
specific statutory criteria justify a declination. With respect to contract funding, 
the awarding agency is required to provide “not less than the appropriate Secre-
tary would have otherwise provided for the operation of the programs or portions 
thereof for the period covered by the contract” (in other words, the same amount 
the agency would have spent to operate the program itself),76 as well as “contract 
support costs” to cover administrative and overhead costs that are not included 
in the program amount.77  
Contracts negotiated under Title I are unique government-to-government 
agreements, and while they are considered legally binding to the same extent as 
regular contracts,78 they differ significantly in other ways from ordinary govern-
ment procurement contracts. For one thing, ISDEAA contracts are generally ex-
empt from the Federal Acquisition Regulations and other Federal contracting or 
 
 72. Id.  
 73. See 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. IV 2016) (authorizing federally recognized tribes or tribal organi-
zations to contract with the IHS to plan, conduct and administer programs, functions, services, or activi-
ties, or portions thereof, that the HIS would otherwise provide for Indians because of their status as Indi-
ans). 
 74. See generally Strommer & Osborne, supra note 71, at 18–49 (describing the legislative history 
and major amendments of the ISDEAA). The most significant amendments include: Indian Self-Determi-
nation and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285; Tribal 
Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; and Tribal Self-Governance Amend-
ments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711; see also 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. IV. 2016) (describing 
all amendments made to Section 5321 since enactment).  
 75. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).   
 76. 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 77. 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 78. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 638–39 (2005) (describing and rejecting 
the Government’s argument that Contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance 
Act are special contracts that should be treated differently from other government procurement contracts).  
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cooperative agreement laws.79 And, while tribes and the agencies have the flex-
ibility to negotiate any provision into a Title I contract that they wish, the Act 
requires that certain mandatory provisions be included in all contracts in order to 
strike a balance between Congress’s policy of promoting tribal self-determina-
tion and maintaining reasonable federal oversight over how contracted responsi-
bilities are carried out.80 Contracting tribes are required to provide an annual au-
dit, but any additional reports must be justified by the agency and negotiated by 
the parties.81 Additionally, an agency may unilaterally reassume a contracted 
program, but only if there is a violation of the rights or endangerment to the 
health, safety, or welfare of any person, or if a contractor mismanages trust funds 
or lands, or interests in such lands.82 And, contracting tribes have the right to 
reallocate funds awarded in a contract, provided the reallocation does not “have 
an adverse effect on the performance of the contract,”83 and to redesign any non-
construction program, with agency approval, to better meet local conditions and 
needs.84 
In 1988, Congress expanded the ISDEAA by enacting the Tribal Self-Gov-
ernance Demonstration Project under Title III.85 The general intent behind self-
 
 79. See 25 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016) (stating that Federal contracting or cooperative 
agreement laws apply only to the extent that such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes). 
 80. See Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, §108, 108 Stat. 
4250, 4261 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5329(c) (Supp. IV 2016)) (amending section 
108(c) of the ISDEAA to set out a “model agreement” that must be included in or incorporated by refer-
ence into every Title I contract).  
 81. See 25 U.S.C. § 5305(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 2016) (indicating that each tribal organization that re-
ceives or uses funds pursuant to a contract must submit a single agency audit report to the Secretary for 
each fiscal year the organization is part of that contract). 
 82. See 25 U.S.C. § 5330 (Supp. IV 2016) (outlining the scenarios in which an agency may assume 
control a contracted program, including a determination by the Secretary that the tribal organization’s 
contract performance involves a violation of the rights or endangerment to the health, safety, or welfare 
of any person, or “gross negligence or mismanagement” in the use of funds, trust funds or lands, or inter-
ests in such lands). 
 83. See 25 U.S.C. § 5325(o) (Supp. IV 2016) (explaining that a tribal organization can rebudget or 
reallocate funds awarded in a contract, as long as the reallocation does not adversely impact the perfor-
mance of the contract).   
 84. 25 U.S.C. § 5324(j) (Supp. IV 2016).  Proposals to redesign a program are subject to the same 
limited statutory declination criteria as a new contract proposal.  See 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(2) (Supp. IV 
2016) (requiring the Secretary to approve a proposal and award a contract unless they find “(A) the service 
to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular program or function to be contracted will not 
be satisfactory; (B) adequate protection of trust resources is not assured; (C) the proposed project or func-
tion to be contracted for cannot be properly completed or maintained by the proposed contract; (D) the 
amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess of the applicable funding level for the contract, 
. . . or (E) the program, function, service, or activity . . . that is the subject of the proposal is beyond the 
scope of programs, functions, services, or activities covered under paragraph (1) because the proposal 
includes activities that cannot lawfully be carried out by the contractor”).  
 85. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
472, §§ 301–06, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296–98 repealed by Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734.  
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governance is similar to self-determination: to implement Congress’s policy of 
allowing tribes to assume control over service delivery of federally funded pro-
grams that benefit Indians and Alaska Natives, and enhancing the ability of tribal 
governments to govern their communities.86 Self-governance implements this in-
tent slightly differently, however, primarily by placing greater emphasis on min-
imizing federal agency oversight and maximizing flexibility for tribes to redesign 
programs and reallocate resources included in a self-governance agreement.87  
“In effect,” self-governance tribes “receive funds in the contractual equivalent of 
block grants from the Secretary.”88 Initially, the self-governance demonstration 
project applied only to Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) programs within Depart-
ment of the Interior, but it proved very popular and was soon expanded to the 
Department of Health and Human Services, where the IHS resides.89 In 1994, 
Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Governance Act, making the program perma-
nent within the Department of the Interior under Title IV,90 and in 2000, Con-
gress made Self-governance a permanent program within the Department of 
Health and Human Services under Title V.91  
Tribes and tribal organizations around the country have made great strides 
in strengthening tribal health care programs and services under the ISDEAA by 
leveraging local tribal accountability and expertise and combining tribal and fed-
eral resources under an increasing array of federal statutory authority. In 2010, 
the IHCIA, which had previously required periodic reauthorization, was 
strengthened and permanently re-enacted under Section 10221 of the Affordable 
Care Act.92 Among the many new and updated provisions are: revisions to Sec-
tion 119 to authorize establishment of a national community health aide program 
(previously operated only in Alaska) to train and certify community health aides 
 
 86. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 1, 5 (1987) (discussing the intent behind the federal policy of Indian 
self-determination: “to increase the ability of tribal governments to plan and delivery services appropriate 
to the needs of tribal members”). 
 87. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 71, at 30–31 (“‘Self-governance’ refers both to the broad 
principle that tribes have the right to govern themselves, and to particular statutory rights enabling them 
to do so through the use of federal program funding.”).  Self-governance has three central initiatives, 
encompassing (1) broadening the scope of programs and responsibilities tribes can oversee; (2) focusing 
on minimizing oversight by federal agencies; and (3) increasing flexibility for tribes to redesign programs 
and reallocate resources in their agreements.  Id.  
 88. Id. at 32. 
 89. Indian Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, § 814, 106 Stat. 4526, 4590 (codified 
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5231 (Supp. IV 2016)) (amending the act to include the Department of Health 
and Human Services).  
 90. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 401, 108 Stat. 4250, 
4272 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5368 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 91. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, §502, 114 Stat. 711, 713–
14 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5382 (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221, 124 Stat. 119, 935–
36 (2010). 
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and community health practitioners to provide health care, health promotion, and 
disease prevention services in Native communities;93 Section 221, which ex-
empts health care professionals employed by the IHS or a tribal health program 
from state licensing requirements in the state in which they are located, provided 
they are licensed in any state;94 Section 407, which authorizes the Department of 
Veterans Affairs to enter into agreements with tribal health programs to receive 
reimbursement for health services to eligible Indian veterans;95 Section 409, 
which allows tribes carrying out ISDEAA contracts or compacts to purchase 
health insurance coverage for its employees through the Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Program;96 and revisions to Title VII to authorize new and ex-
panded services for behavioral health services.97  
In addition to permanently re-enacting the IHCIA, the Affordable Care Act 
included several Indian-specific provisions, including Section 2901(b), which 
provides that the Indian Health Service and tribal health programs are the payors 
of last resort;98 Section 2902, which permanently preserves the ability of the IHS 
and tribal health programs to bill for all Medicare Part B Services by striking a 
5-year sunset provision in prior law;99 and Section 9021, which excludes health 
benefits provided by the IHS and tribal health programs to eligible individuals 
from taxable gross income.100 The Affordable Care Act also included a number 
of special protections for Indians enrolling in a health insurance Marketplace, 
such as special monthly enrollment periods, and cost-sharing exemptions.101 
These provisions were designed to encourage Indian enrollment and otherwise 
expand the financial resources available to IHS and tribal health programs serv-
ing Indians. They have allowed tribes to expand and improve health care pro-
grams and services in impressive ways and may tribal health programs today 
have become key service providers for Indians and non-Indians alike in remote 
and rural areas where access to primary and specialty health care is otherwise 
lacking.102  
 
 93. 25 U.S.C. § 1616l(d) (Supp. IV 2016); see § 10221(a), (b)(1), 124 Stat. at 935–36, for specific 
Section 119 textual changes.  
 94. 25 U.S.C. § 1621t (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted), for text 
outlining Section 221 changes. 
 95. 25 U.S.C. § 1647 (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, for text outlining Section 407 changes. 
 96. 25 U.S.C. § 1647b (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, for text outlining Section 409 changes.  
 97. § 10221(a), 124 Stat. at 935 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1665–1665m, § 1667e (Supp. 
IV 2016)). 
 98. § 2901, 124 Stat. at 333 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C § 1623(b) (Supp. IV 2016)).  
 99. § 2902(a), 124 Stat. at 333 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395qq(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 
2016)).  
 100. § 9021, 124 Stat. at 873–74 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 139D (Supp. IV 2016)).   
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(6)(D) (Supp. IV 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 18071(d) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 102. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5006(a)–(e), 123 
Stat. 115, 505 (2009) (outlining protections for Native Americans enrolled in state Medicaid programs 
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III. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The rise in sophisticated, tribally-operated health care programs and ser-
vices that benefit both Indians and non-Indians alike has begun to raise questions 
about the extent of tribal authority to design and implement those programs and 
services free from state interference. As a matter of tribal law, tribes retain in-
herent sovereignty to self-regulate these matters except to the extent limited by 
tribal customary, constitutional, or other law. Federal law, however, purports to 
limit inherent tribal sovereignty in many respects and in some cases recognizes 
state authority to regulate activity on tribal lands.  
As a matter of federal common law, two lines of authority bear on a tribe’s 
ability to self-regulate health care services within its own territory. These lines 
of authority relate to, first, the application of state laws on tribal lands, and sec-
ond, tribal jurisdictional authority over individuals and activities—in particular, 
non-Indians—on tribal lands. Where no Act of Congress applies to alter the ju-
risdictional division on tribal lands,103 the framework set out by the Supreme 
Court generally precludes the exercise of state authority where that exercise 
would “infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and 
be ruled by them” or where it is preempted by federal law.104 As to the extent of 
tribal authority over non-Indians within reservation boundaries, at the very least 
tribes may exercise civil jurisdiction over such individuals where they have en-
tered into “consensual relationships” with the tribe or its members or where the 
individual’s conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integ-
rity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,”105 though tribal 
authority may be more extensive on trust as opposed to fee lands.  
 
and in the Children’s Health Insurance Program including, but not limited to, property exemptions, des-
ignation of tribal health program as primary care provider, and mandating consultation with Native Amer-
ican health programs on a regular basis). 
 103. In some locations, jurisdictional statutes alter or add another layer to the analysis.  For example, 
Public Law 83–280 confers jurisdiction on six “mandatory” states and several “optional states” over crim-
inal and some civil matters on tribal lands within state borders. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Supp. IV 
2016) (granting states jurisdiction over criminal matters occurring on reservation land); 25 U.S.C. §§ 
1321–1326 (Supp. IV 2016) (granting states jurisdiction in matters involving Indian litigants on reserva-
tion land); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp. IV 2016) (granting states jurisdiction over civil causes of action oc-
curring on reservation land). Civil jurisdiction under Public Law 83–280, however, is limited to the state 
providing a forum to settle disputes among private parties, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 
(1976), and whether a state law is criminal or civil for purposes of Public Law 83–280 depends on whether 
the law is considered civil/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory in nature. See California v. Cabazon Band 
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). Thus, state regulatory laws such as licensing of health care 
professionals are unlikely to apply on tribal lands as a result of Public Law 83–280, but some related 
criminal penalties—such as for practicing without a license—could apply.  
 104. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).  
 105. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted) (“A tribe may 
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
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A. Preemption of State Law and Infringement on Tribal Government 
Historically, the general rule has been that state laws do not apply on Indian 
tribal lands—at least not without an express Act of Congress—as Indian affairs 
is a matter of tribal and federal control.106 As a general matter, this rule still ap-
plies with respect to the property and activities of Indians in Indian country.107 
However, where the actions of non-Indians are involved or state interests are 
particularly strong, the landscape is a bit more complicated, and over recent dec-
ades the courts have allowed for a greater intrusion of state authority on Indian 
reservations.108  
In Williams v. Lee, the Court affirmed that the “basic policy” of Worcester 
v. Georgia remained the law,109 but re-framed the rule of state authority on tribal 
lands as follows: “Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question 
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”110 The Court held in that 
case that to allow the exercise of state court jurisdiction over a civil suit brought 
by a non-Indian against Indian patrons of his store, which was located on the 
Navajo Indian Reservation and operated under a federal license required of per-
sons conducting trade with Indians on Indian reservations, “would undermine the 
 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other ar-
rangements.”).   
 106. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was 
a “distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force[.]”).   
 107. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 170–01 (1973) (“State laws generally 
are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided 
that State laws shall apply.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144 (1980) (“When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at 
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the 
federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.”) (citation omitted)). 
 108. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987) (citing New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1983) (noting that States may assert authority 
over the activities of nonmembers in “certain circumstances,” and may also assert authority over on res-
ervation activities of trial members in “exceptional circumstances.”). The Court pointed to Moe v. Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) and Wash-
ington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 138 (1980), as illustrative: in 
those cases, the Court permitted the State to require tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations to collect 
state sale taxes from non-Indian customers entering the reservation to purchase tobacco products, due to 
the State’s strong interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from non-Indians utilizing state services 
and the “minimal burden” imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators.   
 109. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (“Over the years this Court has modified these 
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would 
not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.”). But see White Mountain Apache 
Tribe, 448 U.S. at 141 (1980) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561) (noting that “Long ago the Court departed 
from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within reservation 
boundaries[.]”). 
 110. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.  
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authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe 
on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”111  
In addition to infringement on the right of tribal self-governance, state au-
thority can also be precluded on tribal lands where it is preempted by federal law.  
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court noted the distinction: 
 Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian 
Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See United States v. Wheeler, 
supra, at 322-323, 98 S.Ct., at 1085-1086. This congressional author-
ity and the “semi-independent position” of Indian tribes have given 
rise to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state 
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the 
exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by federal law. See, e. 
g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 
85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm’n, supra. Second, it may unlawfully infringe “on the right 
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.” 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 
(1959) . . . . The two barriers are independent because either, standing 
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to 
activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.112 
The Supreme Court has summarized the preemption test as follows: 
 State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it 
interferes with or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests re-
flected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient 
to justify the assertion of state authority.113 
This preemption doctrine is different from the general federal preemption 
of state law analysis that applies outside the context of federal Indian law.114  
Specifically, “The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal 
members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority 
has been pre-empted by operation of federal law[,]” and “traditional notions of 
Indian self-government” thus provide “an important backdrop” to the preemption 
 
 111. Id. at 223.  
 112. 448 U.S. at 142–43.  
 113. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334–35 (citations omitted).   
 114. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143 (“The unique historical origins of tribal sov-
ereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards 
of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the 
differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of pre-
emption that are properly applied to the other.”).   
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analysis.115  Due to the pervasive authority of Congress over Indian affairs, Con-
gress need not have expressly spoken on the matter or expressed a specific intent 
to preempt state law in a given area.116 
Rather, in the context of Indian law, the preemption analysis involves a fact-
specific balancing of federal, tribal, and state interests.117 Due in part to its fact-
specific nature, the outcome of the preemption test can be unpredictable.  In gen-
eral, the courts will usually find that state jurisdiction is preempted when the 
matter at issue involves the conduct of Indians on the reservation, or the activities 
of the tribal government itself.118 The greater the involvement of non-Indians or 
non-Indian interests in the activity, however, the greater likelihood that the courts 
will find that state regulation is not preempted.119 For example, in Cotton Petro-
leum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court upheld a severance tax on non-Indian oil 
and gas producers located on-reservation, even though the Tribe imposed its own 
tax and despite the existence of a federal statute governing oil and gas leases on 
Indian lands.120 The Court, emphasizing that the preemption analysis is “flexi-
ble,” and “sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal interest involved,”121 
found “no history of tribal independence from state taxation” of mineral leases 
under federal law.122 It also found that the burden on the Tribe was minimal when 
weighed against the state’s legitimate interest in the tax arising from its provision 
of services to both the Tribe and the mineral lessee, as well as its role in regulat-
ing oil and gas drilling on the reservation.123 In contrast, in New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court held that New Mexico could not apply its 
 
 115. Id; see also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“The Indian 
sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this 
suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be 
read.”).   
 116. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144 (“We have thus rejected the proposition that 
in order to find a particular state law to have been preempted by operation of federal law, an express 
congressional statement to that effect is required.”); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold 
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 885 (1986) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334).  
 117. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (“Each case ‘requires a par-
ticularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.’”) (quoting Ramah Navajo Sch. 
Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)). 
 118. See supra note 107.  
 119. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160–61 (1980) 
(upholding the requirement that the Tribe collect and remit State taxes on cigarette sales to non-Indians); 
see also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 
(1976) (“We therefore agree with the District Court that to the extent that the ‘smoke shops’ sell to those 
upon whom the State has validly imposed a sales or excise tax with respect to the article sold, the State 
may require the Indian proprietor simply to add the tax to the sales price and thereby aid the State’s col-
lection and enforcement thereof.”).  
 120. 490 U.S. at 186.  
 121. Id. at 184.  
 122. Id. at 182.  
 123. Id. at 185–86.  
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fishing and hunting laws to non-members on the tribe’s reservation because the 
state hunting and fishing laws at issue were incompatible with “the comprehen-
sive scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant to federal 
law[,]”124 and because the state could not identify any regulatory function or ser-
vice it provided or off-reservation effects that would justify the assertion of its 
authority over hunting and fishing on the Tribe’s reservation.125  
In an outlier case, Rice v. Rehner, the Supreme Court held that state liquor 
licensing laws could be applied to an individually-owned retail establishment 
operated by a tribal member on the reservation, in part because (in the Court’s 
view) there was no tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or inherent self-gov-
ernment in favor of liquor regulation by Indians.126 Regulation of liquor sales 
presents a unique case: such regulation has been pervasive in Indian country 
since colonial times, so tribal sovereignty with respect to liquor has long been 
impaired—as the Court noted, “in addition to the congressional divestment of 
tribal self-government in this area, the States have also been permitted, and even 
required, to impose regulations related to liquor transactions.”127 The Rice deci-
sion departed from the Supreme Court’s ordinary infringement and preemption 
analysis in its narrow interpretation of the “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty, fo-
cusing on the tribe’s traditional lack of control over liquor regulation rather than 
its tradition of self-government in general.128  
In a later case commonly cited for its preemption analysis, California v. 
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court took a less restrictive ap-
proach and held that the application of California gaming laws to the tribe’s high 
stakes bingo operation on tribal lands was precluded.129 In Cabazon, noting that 
the case involved “a state burden on tribal Indians in the context of their dealings 
with non-Indians” coming from off-reservation, the Court described the preemp-
tion test as follows: 
 Decision in this case turns on whether state authority is pre-empted 
by the operation of federal law; and “[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted 
. . . if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests 
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient 
to justify the assertion of state authority.” Mescalero, 462 U.S., at 333, 
334, 103 S.Ct., at 2385, 2386. The inquiry is to proceed in light of 
traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of 
 
 124. 462 U.S. 324, 338, 343–44 (1983). 
 125. Id. at 341–42.  
 126. 463 U.S. 713, 725 (1983). 
 127. Id. at 723.  
 128. Id. at 738–40. 
 129. 480 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1987).  
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Indian self-government, including its “overriding goal” of encourag-
ing tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. Id., at 334-335, 
103 S.Ct., at 2386-2387.130 
In applying that test, the Court noted that in addition to the “important fed-
eral interests” of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, the federal 
government actively approved of and promoted tribal bingo enterprises in spe-
cific ways: for example, the Secretary of the Interior had made grants and guar-
anteed loans for constructing bingo facilities, and approved the tribal ordinances 
establishing and regulating the very gaming activities that the state sought to 
regulate.131 The tribes’ interests, the Court further noted, were “obviously paral-
lel” to the federal interests, in that the bingo enterprises provided the sole source 
of revenue for tribal government and services, and were a major source of em-
ployment on the tribes’ reservations.132 Nor were the tribes “merely marketing 
an exemption from state gambling laws,” as the Court had found in some cases 
involving state taxation on the sale of tobacco products on tribal lands:133  
 Here, however, the Tribes are not merely importing a product onto 
the reservations for immediate resale to non-Indians. They have built 
modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancil-
lary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reser-
vations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of 
time there enjoying the services the Tribes provide. The Tribes have a 
strong incentive to provide comfortable, clean, and attractive facilities 
and well-run games in order to increase attendance at the games. The 
tribal bingo enterprises are similar to the resort complex, featuring 
hunting and fishing, that the Mescalero Apache Tribe operates on its 
reservation through the “concerted and sustained” management of res-
ervation land and wildlife resources. 134  
 
 130. Id. at 216.  
 131. Id. at 217–18 (“Under the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and 
Supp. III), the Secretary of the Interior has made grants and has guaranteed loans for the purpose of con-
structing bingo facilities. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, p. 5 (1986); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 
626 F. Supp. 245, 246 (Conn. 1986). The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the De-
partment of Health and Human Services have also provided financial assistance to develop tribal gaming 
enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, supra, at 4. Here, the Secretary of the Interior has approved tribal 
ordinances establishing and regulating the gaming activities involved. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-488, p. 10 
(1986). The Secretary has also exercised his authority to review tribal bingo management contracts under 
25 U.S.C. § 81, and has issued detailed guidelines governing that review.”). 
 132. Id. at 218–19.  
 133. Id. at 219; see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 
U.S. 134, 155–57 (1980) (upholding state cigarette sales tax deemed to fall on the non-Indian purchasers 
of cigarettes on tribal lands, finding that the value marketed to those purchasers was not generated on the 
reservation and citing the State’s strong interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from non-Indians 
utilizing state services). 
 134. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. Id. at 219–20 (New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 462 U.S., at 341, 103 S.Ct., at 2390).  
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The Court thus concluded, “the Cabazon and Morongo Bands are generat-
ing value on the reservations through activities in which they have a substantial 
interest.”135 In contrast, the Court determined that the state’s asserted interest in 
preventing the infiltration of tribal bingo by organized crime was weak because 
the state permitted the play of charity bingo games within the state.136 As a result, 
the Court held, state regulation was preempted.137  
B. Tribal Authority over Non-Indians on Tribal Lands 
Apart from the preemption of state law, to realistically and successfully 
self-regulate the provision of health care services on tribal lands, tribes need to 
exercise civil regulatory and perhaps adjudicatory power over non-Indians. The 
question here is the extent to which federal law continues to recognize a tribe’s 
inherent authority to do so. 
Montana v. United States is considered a critically important precedential 
decision on the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.138 Montana 
involved the question of whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fish-
ing by nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the boundaries of the Crow 
Indian Reservation.139 Reversing the Court of Appeals, which held that such reg-
ulatory power was an incident of the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty over its reser-
vation, the Supreme Court instead held that: “As a general proposition, the in-
herent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe.”140 The Court continued, however, stating: 
 To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise 
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reserva-
tions, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through tax-
ation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who en-
ter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe 
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the con-
duct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that con-
duct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the 
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.141 
Thus, Montana establishes that one of these two exceptions must be met 
before a tribe may regulate the activities of non-members on non-Indian fee lands 
 
 135. Id. at 220.  
 136. Id. at 221 n. 25.  
 137. Id. at 221–22.  
 138. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).  
 139. Id. at 557. 
 140. Id. at 565.   
 141. Id. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted).   
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within reservation boundaries. In that case, the Court found that neither excep-
tion applied, and that the Crow Tribe therefore could not impose its hunting and 
fishing regulations on non-Indians on the fee lands at issue.142  
In a later case, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Nation, the Court applied its Montana analysis to hold that tribal zoning 
and land use laws did not apply to non-Indian fee land within the tribe’s reserva-
tion.143 The Court interpreted Montana’s second exception quite narrowly to al-
low tribal regulation only when the impact of the non-Indian conduct is “demon-
strably serious” and “imperils” the political integrity, the economic security, or 
the health or welfare of the tribe.144 The Supreme Court has further emphasized 
the narrow nature of the Montana exceptions in subsequent cases.  In Strate v. 
A-1 Contractors, for example, the Court held that a car accident on a state high-
way running through the Tribe’s reservation did not fall within either exception 
for purposes of establishing tribal court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by 
a non-Indian reservation resident injured in the accident, even though the defend-
ant (A-1 Contractors) was engaged in contract work for the Tribe on the reserva-
tion.145 With respect to the first exception, the Court held that although A-1 Con-
tractors had a “consensual relationship” with the Tribe, the plaintiff was not a 
party to the contract and the Tribe was not involved in the accident, so the rela-
tionship was not of the “qualifying kind” to establish jurisdiction.146 As for the 
second exception, the Court stated: “Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on 
a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and 
surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana’s second excep-
tion requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”147  
While the Court in Strate was faced with the scope of the Tribe’s adjudica-
tive jurisdiction (specifically, the ability of the tribal court to hear tort claims 
brought against a non-Indian defendant), the Court nevertheless employed the 
Montana analysis.  The Strate majority explained: 
 While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the 
Court broadly addressed the concept of “inherent sovereignty.” Re-
garding activity on non-Indian fee land within a reservation, Montana 
delineated—in a main rule and exceptions—the bounds of the power 
 
 142. Id. at 564–67. 
 143. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indians, 492 U.S. 408, 422 (1989). 
 144. Id. at 431.   
 145. 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997).  
 146. Id. at 457. 
 147. Id. at 457–58; see Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001) (“The consensual 
relationship must stem from ‘commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,’ Montana, 450 
U.S. at 565, and a nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, and medical services does 
not create the requisite connection. If it did, the exception would swallow the rule[.]”); see also Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008).  
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tribes retain to exercise “forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”  
As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does 
not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.148 
The Court further held that the right-of-way held by the state rendered the 
state highway on which the underlying accident occurred “equivalent, for non-
member governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land[,]” even though the 
accident occurred within the borders of the reservation.149   
Montana, Brendale, and Strate thus all addressed tribal jurisdictional au-
thority over non-Indians on fee land or its “equivalent” within reservation bound-
aries.150 The extent to which the same analysis—with its broad general rule 
against tribal authority and two narrow exceptions—applies to tribal trust land is 
still not completely clear. Less than one year after Montana, the Court in Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe upheld the Tribe’s ability to tax non-Indian oil and gas 
producers on tribal lands as an exercise of “the tribe’s general authority, as sov-
ereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction” and “a necessary in-
strument of self-government and territorial management.”151 Alternatively, the 
Court reasoned, the Tribe had authority to impose the tax by virtue of its power 
to exclude non-members—a power that “necessarily includes the lesser power to 
place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct, such 
as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation.”152 The Court in 
Merrion reached these conclusions without ever suggesting that Montana might 
pose any bar to the Tribe’s exercise of such authority or that the Tribe was re-
quired to meet one of the two Montana exceptions in order to do so.153  Indeed, 
in Montana itself the Court expressly “agreed” with the Court of Appeals that, 
“on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the 
Tribe,” a tribe may regulate activities of nonmembers.154   
However, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a tribal court 
lacked jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who had entered trib-
 
 148. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–65 (1981)). 
 149. Id. at 454.  
 150. See id. at 456–58; Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of 
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989). 
 151. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
 152. Id. at 144.   
 153. See generally Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
 154. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1980).  Likewise, the second exception itself refers 
to “civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [the tribe’s] reservation[.]”  Id. at 
566. Subsequent decisions of this Court have also seemed to confirm this understanding of the scope of 
the Montana rule and its exceptions.  See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (describing Montana and its exceptions 
as “[r]egarding activity on non-Indian fee land”); see also Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 
645, 654 (2001) (referring to “Montana’s general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmem-
bers on non-Indian fee land”). 
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ally-owned land to execute a warrant against a tribal member for an off-reserva-
tion violation of state law.155 In so holding, the Court stated that Indian land 
ownership does not suspend “the ‘general proposition’ … that ‘the inherent sov-
ereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers 
of the tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or 
to control internal relations.’”156 The Court explained: “The ownership status of 
the land, in other words, is only one factor to consider in determining whether 
regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.’”157  
Hicks itself arguably addressed only a narrow question arising from an ex-
treme set of facts—i.e. a tribe’s ability to regulate state law enforcement’s exe-
cution of a search warrant relating to off-reservation violations of state law.158 
Under the unique facts of that case, the Court held that tribal court jurisdiction 
was precluded because “the principle that Indians have the right to make their 
own laws and be governed by them requires an accommodation between the in-
terests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of 
the State, on the other.”159 At the same time, the Court recognized that in the 
ordinary case the status of the land in question is “significant” or even “disposi-
tive” to the underlying question of whether the exercise of tribal authority is 
“necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”160   
Hicks, therefore, did not fully answer the question of the applicability of the 
Montana rule and its narrow exceptions to tribal authority over non-members on 
tribal lands. The Court in Hicks also employed the Montana analysis while not-
ing that it remains an “open question” whether tribal court jurisdiction over non-
Indian defendants in general is as broad as the Tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction, or 
 
 155. 533 U.S. 353, 366–68 (2001).  
 156. Id. at 358–60 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65) (noting, in addition, that it was “impl[ied] 
that the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”).   
 157. Id. at 360.  
 158. Id. at 358 n. 2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over 
state officers enforcing state law.”). 
 159. Id. at 362 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 477 U.S. 134, 
156 (1980)).  The Court accordingly held that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing pro-
cess related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or 
internal relations[.]”  Id. at 364. 
 160. Id. at 370–71 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65).  In response to criticism by Justice O’Connor 
in her concurring opinion that the Court did not sufficiently consider the status of the land at issue, the 
Hicks majority further stated: “To the contrary, we acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor in the 
Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it ‘may sometimes be . . . dispositive[.]’ . . .  We 
simply do not find it dispositive in the present case, when weighed against the State’s interest in pursuing 
off-reservation violations of its laws.”  Id. at 370 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 360).   
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whether there are additional limitations on that adjudicatory jurisdiction.161 After 
granting a writ of certiorari in a recent case that could potentially have resolved 
those questions, an equally divided Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with no 
explanation.162 A fair reading of the Court’s precedent as a whole, however, and 
the most consistent with the history of federal Indian law and policy dating back 
to Worcester v. Georgia, is that tribes retain broader latitude to regulate and ad-
judicate the conduct of nonmembers on tribal lands than on non-Indian fee lands, 
because a Tribe’s interests in self-government and territorial management are 
strongest on its own lands and because the Tribe also retains its inherent authority 
to exclude nonmembers from its lands altogether.163 Nevertheless, the safest way 
for Tribes to ensure that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians will be upheld under 
federal law is by obtaining explicit consent to jurisdiction under Montana’s first 
exception where possible.  
IV.  PRACTICAL ISSUES RELATED TO TRIBAL SELF-REGULATION OF HEALTH 
CARE DELIVERY  
On the basis of inherent tribal authority, federal common law, and the fed-
eral statutory framework provided by the ISDEAA, the IHCIA, and other federal 
laws, tribes and tribal health programs across the country have begun to move 
beyond just the operation of federal Indian health programs to the development 
and implementation of robust, tribally driven programs that address local needs 
in new and innovative ways. These programs are still supported by and consistent 
with federal law and policy goals, and often rely to a significant degree on federal 
funding. However, as tribes themselves begin to play a larger role in the design 
 
 161. Id. at 357–58, 358 n. 2.  The Court determined it did “not have to answer that open question” 
since it determined that the Tribe lacked regulatory jurisdiction over the State officials in any event.  Id. 
at 358.  
 162. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), aff’g by an 
equally divided court, Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 
2014) (upholding tribal court jurisdiction, on the basis of Montana’s consensual relations exception, over 
non-Indian corporation that operated a store on the Tribe’s reservation).   
 163. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (distinguishing land owned by or held in trust for the Tribe from 
fee land owned by nonmembers and agreeing that the Tribe may prohibit or regulate hunting and fishing 
on such tribal lands); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (upholding a 
Tribe’s power to tax nonmember activity on tribal lands and observing that a Tribe’s interests in levying 
taxes is strongest when the taxed activity takes place on tribal lands).  Under this theory, Tribes must meet 
one of Montana’s two exceptions on non-Indian fee land because, under such circumstances, those excep-
tions exclusively define the scope of tribal authority “necessary to protect tribal self-government or control 
internal relations.”  See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001) (“Although 
we extracted from our precedents the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian 
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe . . .  we nonetheless noted in Montana two 
possible bases for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land.”) (internal quotations marks and citations 
omitted)).  However, on tribal trust lands, the exceptions may be more flexibly applied or may not be the 
only means of establishing tribal authority that is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or control 
internal relations.”  Montana, 450 U.S. at 564. 
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and implementation of Indian health care services, and as tribal health programs 
begin to serve a broader base of individuals on tribal lands, tribal self-regulation 
in the health care field becomes increasingly significant. This is especially true 
where existing federal programs are insufficient and where state regulation 
works at cross-purposes with tribal and local community needs. While the exist-
ing legal framework recognizes and allows for such tribal self-regulation of 
health care, in some areas that framework could be improved to further encour-
age and foster innovation in tribal health care consistent with the federal trust 
responsibility.  
To begin with, the potential regulatory matters that arise in the design and 
implementation of tribal health care programs and services are many. They could 
include, for example, the application of state and/or tribal licensing requirements 
to, and the ongoing regulation of, health care professionals, facilities, and ser-
vices, as well as enforcement jurisdiction, including for private claims such as 
medical torts. These regulatory matters raise jurisdictional questions that, for the 
most part, currently must be resolved under the Supreme Court’s preemption/in-
fringement analysis, outlined above. Beyond such jurisdictional questions, tribes 
must also consider the availability of federal resources to support tribal pro-
grams. Specifically, existing provisions of federal health care law that serve to 
implement the federal trust responsibility by funneling federal resources into the 
Indian health system were largely designed with the assumption that tribes would 
implement existing federal programs, with perhaps some modifications. There 
has been movement toward increased tribal flexibility in recent decades, how-
ever, including for example greater freedom for tribes to serve non-beneficiaries 
without losing benefits and protections available under their ISDEAA contract. 
These recent updates to the legal framework have allowed for significant ad-
vancements in the tribal health care system and provide a roadmap for future 
improvement through increased support for tribal self-regulation.  
A. Regulatory and Preemption Issues: Licensing, Regulatory, and Enforcement 
Authority  
As a matter of federal law under the IHCIA, licensed health professionals 
employed by a tribal health program are exempt from the licensing requirements 
of the state in which the tribal health program is located, provided they are li-
censed in any other state.164 When a tribe or tribal organization provides services 
 
 164. 25 U.S.C. § 1621t (Supp. IV 2016) (“Licensed health professionals employed by a tribal health 
program shall be exempt, if licensed in any State, from the licensing requirements of the State in which 
the tribal health program performs the services described in the contract or compact of the tribal health 
program under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.”).  In addition, for purposes 
of participation as a provider of health care services under a Federal health care program (such as Medi-
  
2018] TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY 143 
 
pursuant to an ISDEAA contract or compact,165 these federal licensing rules 
preempt state licensing requirements. Where a tribe operates a health care pro-
gram or provides health care services outside of an ISDEAA contract, however, 
or where the tribe regulates but does not itself operate the program or service, 
the application of state licensure laws would be subject to the preemption/in-
fringement analysis discussed in Section III.A above.166 
Where a tribe has adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework for li-
censure and regulation of health care professionals, there is a good argument 
against state interference under the preemption/infringement analysis. As in New 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that the state 
could not apply its hunting and fishing laws to non-Indians on the reservation 
because the Tribe had its own comprehensive program of fish and game man-
agement,167 application of state licensure requirements are likely to be incon-
sistent with tribal requirements and would interfere with tribal self-government 
in the field. Further, even though the federal government generally does not reg-
ulate licensure of health care professionals or license health care facilities, but 
rather leaves such regulation to the states, federal interests nevertheless strongly 
support the development of robust tribal health programs according to tribal pri-
orities and without state interference. This interest is clearly reflected in the 
ISDEAA and the IHCIA, special Medicare and Medicaid and other federal health 
care program provisions for American Indians and Alaska Natives, and regula-
tions across the federal government—from the IHS to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services—implementing federal 
statutory law, the federal trust responsibility to improve the health status of In-
dian people, and tribal self-determination policy.168 In this sense, the argument 
for preemption of state licensing and regulation of health care professionals 
tracks the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cabazon in holding that state gaming 
regulation was preempted on tribal lands: the “important federal interests” and 
express federal support for tribal health care programs; parallel federal and tribal 
interests; and the value generated by the development of tribal health programs 
all weigh in favor of tribal self-regulation.  
 
care, Medicaid, and CHIP), entities operated by the Indian Health Service, an Indian tribe or tribal organ-
ization, or an urban Indian organization are deemed to have met state licensing requirements if they meet 
all the applicable standards for such licensure, regardless of whether they actually obtain the license.  25 
U.S.C. § 1647a (Supp. IV 2016). 
 165. Section 1621t applies to “tribal health programs,” defined under the IHCIA as “an Indian tribe or 
tribal organization that operates any health program, service, function, activity, or facility funded, in whole 
or in part, by the [Indian Health] Service through, or provided in, a contract or compact with the Service 
under the [ISDEAA].”  25 U.S.C. § 1603(25) (Supp. IV 2016).  
 166. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 167. 462 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1983).   
 168. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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To enforce its licensure and regulatory scheme against non-Indian practi-
tioners, however, a tribe would have to establish jurisdiction over those individ-
uals under the Montana/Merrion/Hicks line of cases, as discussed above. Due to 
the narrow way in which the Supreme Court has framed the Montana exceptions, 
and to the extent those exceptions apply with the same force on tribal lands, the 
courts may not be willing to apply the second “health or welfare of the Tribe” 
exception to establish tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians involved in health care 
on tribal lands, even though there is clearly a rational argument that the regula-
tion of health care programs and services in fact goes to the very heart of the 
“health and welfare” of the tribe. Regardless, there are various ways that tribes 
may seek to affirm jurisdiction to license and regulate non-Indian health care 
professionals under the second “consensual relationship” exception, including 
through written acknowledgement of tribal jurisdiction as a prerequisite to em-
ployment in a tribal health program or entry onto tribal lands for purposes of 
providing health care services, or on the basis of the Tribe’s right to self-govern 
and exclude individuals from tribal lands under Merrion.169  
A similar analysis, for both preemption of state law and tribal regulatory 
jurisdiction, would apply to the regulation of health care facilities and practices 
(such as the use of traditional, alternative, or complimentary medicine), and to 
tribal court jurisdiction over medical torts such as malpractice claims arising on 
tribal lands. These questions involve not only health care practitioners, who may 
enter into specific employment, licensing, or other types of agreements with the 
tribe in order to provide health care services on tribal lands, but also patients 
(both Indian and non-Indian) and other individuals present on tribal lands coming 
into contact with health care providers and program administrators. With respect 
to the preemption/infringement analysis, the determination in each case is fact-
specific and would depend to some extent on the type of tribal regulatory scheme 
at issue, specific federal laws and regulations that may be relevant, and the state 
interest at issue. The federal government’s trust responsibility to provide for In-
dian health care, its policy in support of tribal self-determination, and the com-
prehensive federal scheme reflected in the ISDEAA and the IHCIA, among other 
 
 169. JANE M. SMITH, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7–8, 10 (Cong. 
Research Serv. 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43324.pdf.  While the regulation of health care pro-
fessionals by tribes in the manner contemplated here is relatively new, there are many parallels in tribal 
regulation of legal professionals practicing in tribal courts—something that is quite common. Many tribes 
require membership in a tribal court bar and may impose various requirements on admission, including in 
some cases separate bar exams.  See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion 99-13, STATE BAR OF ARIZ. 
(1999), http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ 
ViewEthicsOpinion?id=507 (last visited July 20, 2018) (explaining that attorneys’ supervision of non-
lawyer paralegals’ representation of clients in tribal court is not in violation of Arizona lawyer’s duty not 
to assist in the unauthorized practice of law, where paralegal was a licensed tribal court advocate, because 
tribal court’s rules govern the conduct and it is not “unauthorized” under those rules).  
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federal laws, should all play a role in this analysis. With respect to tribal juris-
diction, to the extent a tribe can secure specific agreement to tribal civil jurisdic-
tion, such as through a land or building lease or patient consent forms, the juris-
dictional analysis is simplified. In the absence of written agreement, tribes should 
be able to advance the argument that their interests in self-government and terri-
torial management under Merrion, or one of the Montana exceptions, justifies 
tribal jurisdiction over individuals entering onto tribal lands for purposes of 
providing or obtaining health care services, particularly on tribal trust (as op-
posed to fee) lands.  
B. Federal Benefits and Protections for Tribal Health Programs 
Apart from such jurisdictional questions, another important consideration 
for tribes is the extent to which they may self-regulate health care services and 
implement innovative new health care programs on tribal lands while still main-
taining the many special federal benefits and protections available to tribes and 
tribal organizations implementing federal programs under the ISDEAA.170 These 
benefits and protections serve to maintain the federal government’s trust respon-
sibility to provide for health care to Indian people even as tribes themselves ex-
ercise more control over the design and implementation of specific programs and 
services. They also serve to assist tribes in addressing the chronic resource short-
age that still exists throughout Indian Country today as a direct result of historical 
federal policies dispossessing tribes of resources as well as control over those 
resources that remained in tribal possession.  
One important benefit extended to tribal contractors under the ISDEAA is 
coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).171 In the FTCA, the United 
States waived its immunity and consented to be sued for money damages for 
injury or loss of property caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions 
of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.172 So long as 
they are performing services under an ISDEAA contract or compact, the FTCA 
also covers a tribe’s permanent or temporary employees, volunteers, and federal 
employees assigned to the contract to work for the tribe.173 Coverage extends to 
individuals providing health services to the tribal contractor under personal ser-
vices contracts in facilities operated under ISDEAA contracts or compacts,174 
 
 170. See, e.g., Starla K. Roels & Liz Malerba, New Opportunities for Innovative Healthcare Partner-
ships with Indian Tribes and Tribal Organizations, HEALTH LAWYER, Oct. 2015, at 25–26, 29. 
 171. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(d) (Supp. IV 2016); 25 U.S.C. §5396(a) (Supp. IV 2016); 25 C.F.R.§ 900.180 
(2018); 42 C.F.R. § 137.220 (2017).  
 172. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).  Pursuant to the FTCA, as amended by the Federal 
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, an action against the United States is the exclu-
sive judicial remedy for such claims.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).  
 173. 25 C.F.R. § 900.192 (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 900.206 (2018).   
 174. 25 C.F.R. § 900.193 (2018). 
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and also to tribal employees paid from tribal funds other than those provided 
through the contract or compact, as long as the services or activities from which 
the claim arose were performed in carrying out the contract or compact.175 For 
covered categories of claims, an FTCA claim against the United States is the 
exclusive remedy, meaning that any employee or personal services contractor for 
the tribe, acting within the scope of his or her employment in carrying out an 
ISDEAA contract, will be shielded from liability by the FTCA.176 FTCA cover-
age was extended to tribes under the ISDEAA because Congress recognized that 
the diversion of program funds to purchase liability insurance led to a decrease 
in funding for direct services, putting contracting tribes at a disadvantage and 
contravening the federal trust responsibility.177  
Other provisions applicable to tribal health care programs operated under 
the ISDEAA are specifically intended to supplement inadequate IHS funding by 
leveraging or providing access to other federal or private insurance funding.  For 
example, tribal health programs operating under the ISDEAA are specifically 
authorized to seek reimbursements for services from Medicare, Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), as well other third-party payors, 
such as private health insurance companies.178 Under the authority of the Public 
Health Service Act, the IHCIA and other federal law and policy, tribal health 
programs billing for Medicare and Medicaid may collect at what is known as the 
 
 175. 25 C.F.R. § 900.197 (2018). 
 176. 25 C.F.R. § 900.190 (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 900.204 (2018).  FTCA coverage does not extend to: 
(1) claims against most subcontractors; (2) claims for injuries covered by workmen’s compensation; (3) 
breach of contract (as opposed to tort) claims; or (4) claims resulting from activities performed by an 
employee that are outside the scope of employment.  25 C.F.R. § 900.183 (2018). 
 177. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-00-169, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT: 
ISSUES AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS 6 (2000), 
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00169.pdf.  
 178. Historically, the ability to collect Medicare and Medicaid depended in large part on provider type, 
facility type, and the program at issue, and before 1976, tribally operated health programs could not collect 
reimbursements from Medicare or Medicaid.  After 1976, provisions under the Social Security Act and 
the IHCIA, as amended over several years, generally authorized certain “facilities of the IHS,” whether 
operated by the IHS or by a tribe or tribal organization, to collect Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements.  
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395qq, 1396j (Supp. IV 2016); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1641, 1642 (Supp. IV 2016).  See 
also INDIAN HEALTH SERV. & HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE AND THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (1996), 
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/American-Indian-Alaska-Native/AIAN/LTSS-TA-
Center/pdf/memorandum-of-agreement.pdf.  [hereinafter 1996 MOA].  The Health Care Financing Ad-
ministration is now called the “Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.” H. REP. NO. 108-391, at 
312–315 (2003). When the IHCIA was reauthorized in 2010, the new Section 401 of the Act significantly 
revised the old language regarding authority to collect such payments:  Section 401(d) authorizes tribal 
health programs to elect to “directly bill for, and receive payment for, health care items and services pro-
vided by such programs for which payment is made under [Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP] . . . or from 
any other third party payor.”  25 U.S.C. § 1641 (Supp. IV 2016); see Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat. 119, 935–36 (2010), for specific Section 401 textual 
changes.  
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IHS “encounter rate” (also called the “OMB rate”), which the Department of 
Health and Human Services publishes in the Federal Register each year, for cer-
tain inpatient and outpatient medical services.179 Additionally, section 1905(b) 
of the Social Security Act provides that the Federal medical assistance percent-
age (in other words, the cost share paid by the federal government for Medicaid 
services) “shall be 100 per centum with respect to amounts expended as medical 
assistance for services which are received through an Indian Health Service fa-
cility whether operated by the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe or tribal 
organization[.]”180 While not a direct benefit to tribal health providers per se, the 
federal government’s promise to reimburse state Medicaid programs for 100% 
of services provided to IHS beneficiaries through the IHS or a tribal health facil-
ity provides an important incentive for states to work with Tribes to maximize 
the availability of Medicaid services to IHS beneficiaries served by tribal health 
programs.181 
Another example is access to pharmaceuticals for eligible Indian benefi-
ciaries at a discount from the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Section 105(k) of 
the ISDEAA authorizes Indian tribes and tribal organizations to utilize the FSS 
for purposes of carrying out ISDEAA contracts and compacts and deems the 
tribes and tribal organizations to be part of the IHS and their employees to be 
federal employees for this purpose.182 Section 105(k) specifically includes ac-
quisitions from prime vendors: 
 
 179. 82 Fed. Reg. 5585, 5855 (Jan. 18, 2017).  Under Section 1905(l)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act, 
outpatient health programs or facilities operated by a Tribe or Tribal organization under the ISDEAA are 
by definition Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and thus may instead elect to bill Medicaid as 
FQHCs if they prefer. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(l)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2016); see also 1996 MOA, supra note 178, 
at 1–3 (affirming that tribal facilities could choose to be designated as an IHS provider, allowing them to 
collect at the IHS encounter rate for payment of Medicaid services provided to eligible Indian beneficiaries 
on or after July 11, 1996). 
 180. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (Supp. IV 2016); see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, § 1905(b), 124 Stat. 119, 284 (2010), for relevant amendments pertaining to section 1905(b). 
 181. Letter from Vikki Wachino, Director, Department of Health and Human Services, Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials, SHO #16-002 (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/sho022616.pdf.  A recent change to the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s interpretation of section 1905(b) increases that incentive.  Id.  
Previously, CMS interpreted section 1905(b) to exclude services rendered by outside providers through 
the Purchased/Referred Care (PRC) program administered by the IHS and tribes.  Id. In a February 26, 
2016 letter to State Health Officials, however, CMS announced that it would update its interpretation of 
section 1905(b) to extend 100% FMAP to services rendered by a non-IHS or non-tribal provider so long 
as that care is provided pursuant to a care coordination agreement meeting certain requirements.  Id. It is 
up to the IHS or tribal health program to enter into these care coordination agreements, which render the 
State eligible for 100% FMAP for Medicaid services provided thereunder.  Id.   
 182. 25 U.S.C. § 5324(k) (Supp. IV 2016); Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-413, § 102, 108 Stat. 4250, 4255.  Section 105(k) is specifically made applicable to Title V 
compacts and funding agreements by § 516(a) of Title V.  Tribal Self–Governance Amendments of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 516(a), 114 Stat. 711, 729 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5396(a) (Supp. IV 
2016)). 
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For purposes of carrying out such contract, grant or agreement [under 
the ISDEAA], the Secretary shall, at the request of an Indian tribe, 
enter into an agreement for the acquisition, on behalf of the Indian 
tribe, of any goods, services, or supplies available to the Secretary 
from the General Services Administration or other Federal agencies 
that are not directly available to the Indian tribe under this section or 
under any other Federal law, including acquisitions from prime ven-
dors. All such acquisitions shall be undertaken through the most effi-
cient and speedy means practicable, including electronic ordering ar-
rangements.183   
This includes the VA prime vendor program, which makes certain listed federal 
agencies (including the IHS) eligible to purchase drugs from the FSS at discounts 
determined under agreements between the manufacturers and the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs.184 
Questions over the scope of these provisions may arise when tribes choose 
to design and implement a tribal health care program outside the scope of an 
ISDEAA contract—perhaps in order to address a local health care need that is 
not adequately addressed by any existing federal program.  In some cases, federal 
law has evolved to support tribal innovation by affording tribes greater flexibility 
than the IHS in the implementation of federal programs under the ISDEAA, at 
least to some degree—thereby avoiding those questions. This is the case, for ex-
ample, with respect to who may be considered eligible for health care programs 
and services. The IHS’s federal regulations define who is eligible for health care 
services directly from the IHS and for services the IHS must purchase from non-
IHS providers (called “Purchased/Referred Care” or “PRC,” and formerly known 
as “contract health services”).185 The general rule is that the IHS will provide 
direct services at IHS facilities to persons of Indian descent belonging to the In-
dian community served by the local facilities and program.186 In its direct-oper-
ated facilities, the IHS itself follows an “Open Door Policy” under which the 
facility will serve any eligible Indian beneficiary presenting for available ser-
vices regardless of where that person resides. Eligibility for PRC from the IHS 
is directly tied to being eligible for direct care services under the IHS regulations, 
 
 183. § 7, 114 Stat. at 732 (codified as amended at § 25 U.S.C. 5324(k) (Supp. IV 2016) (alteration in 
original) (emphasis added). 
 184. 38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2), (b)(3) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 185. 42 C.F.R. § 136a.12 (2017). 
 186. 42 C.F.R. § 136a.12(a) (2017).  Services may also be provided to a non-Indian woman pregnant 
with an eligible Indian’s child for a certain time period, and to non-Indian members of an eligible Indian’s 
household if the IHS determines that such care is necessary to control a public health hazard or an acute 
infectious disease.  Id. § 136a.12(b)(2)–(3).  Other non-Indians may be provided direct care services by 
the IHS in certain limited circumstances.  See 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2016) (outlining eligi-
bility for direct health care services for children and spouses).  
  
2018] TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY 149 
 
and also requires either (1) residence within the United States and on a reserva-
tion located in a defined health care delivery area; or (2) residence within the 
United States outside of the reservation but within a defined health care delivery 
area and either (a) membership in the tribe or tribes located on that reservation 
(or for which the reservation was established) or (b) maintenance of “close eco-
nomic and social ties with that tribe or tribes.”187 
As a general rule, tribal health programs must also make eligibility deter-
minations for direct care and PRC subject to the IHS’s eligibility regulations.188 
For direct care services, a tribal ISDEAA contractor would thus provide direct 
care to “persons of Indian descent belonging to the Indian community served” 
by that tribal program’s facilities.189 However, tribes operating their own health 
care programs under an ISDEAA contract or compact are not required to follow 
the IHS’s Open Door policy unless they specifically agree to do so.190  
Further, under Section 813 of the IHCIA, as revised under the 2010 perma-
nent reauthorization, tribes and tribal organizations operating under an ISDEAA 
contract or compact can elect to serve non-beneficiaries (i.e., individuals who 
would not otherwise be eligible for IHS services) based on a determination that 
the provision of those services will not result in a denial or diminution of services 
to eligible Indian beneficiaries.191 In making that determination, tribes and tribal 
organizations can consider that payment could be required from such individuals 
for services received. Indeed, it may make good business sense – as well as fill a 
community need – for tribal health programs to serve non-beneficiaries as well 
as tribal members and other IHS beneficiaries within their geographic area. Im-
portantly, where a tribe decides to serve non-beneficiaries under a Section 813 
resolution, the statute specifically provides that “Any services provided by the 
Indian tribe or tribal organization pursuant to a determination made under this 
subparagraph shall be deemed to be provided under the agreement entered into 
by the Indian tribe or tribal organization under the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act.”192 This provision ensures that, so long as services to 
 
 187. 42 C.F.R. § 136.23(a) (2017).  Other groups also have limited PRC eligibility, such as students 
and transients, foster children and persons who leave their PRC health service delivery area. Id. § 
136.23(b)–(d).   
 188. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
472, § 204, 102 Stat. 2285, 2291–92 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5324(g) (Supp. IV 2016)) (re-
classifying Section 106 as Section 105); Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
260, § 517(e), 114 Stat. 711, 730 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5397(e) (Supp. IV 2016)).   
 189. 42 C.F.R. § 136.12(a) (2017).  In situations of doubt as to whether a person is eligible for care, 
the regulations allow for input from the Bureau of Indian Affairs about each individual’s “continuing 
relationship to the Indian population served by the local program.”  Id. § 136.12(b).   
 190. 25 U.S.C. § 5329(c) (Supp. IV 2016) (stating that the ISDEAA, tribal contractors are not bound 
by IHS policies or guidance unless they specifically agree).   
 191. 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2016).  
 192. Id. 
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non-beneficiaries are included in the tribe’s scope of work for its ISDEAA agree-
ments, the tribe will not lose the benefits and protections otherwise available to 
it under those agreements as a result of its sovereign decision to extend services 
to non-Indians. 
This authority for tribes to determine whether to serve non-beneficiaries in 
the operation of tribal health programs without losing the benefits and protections 
available under their ISDEAA contract is thus an existing example of how fed-
eral laws can support tribal health programs even when they extend beyond mere 
implementation of a parallel federal program.  The model—i.e., deeming those 
services to be performed under an ISDEAA contract—is relatively straightfor-
ward under the existing legal framework, and could be applied elsewhere with 
relatively minor adjustments to existing federal laws. The issue becomes more 
complicated, however, where the tribe regulates but does not itself operate a 
health care program or facility. As one example, Medicare and Medicaid laws 
and regulations require that health care providers and facilities be state licensed 
as a condition of reimbursement.193 Under the IHCIA, tribal health programs are 
deemed to have met state licensing requirements for such purposes if they meet 
all the applicable standards for licensure, regardless of whether they actually ob-
tain the license.194 However, if a tribe licenses a non-tribal provider on tribal 
lands and does not require parallel state licensing, Medicare and Medicaid reim-
bursements to that facility could be jeopardized. In some ways, then, existing 
federal laws lag behind tribal innovation in the provision of health care to tribal 
communities.  
V. CASE STUDY: THE SWINOMISH TRIBE’S DENTAL THERAPIST PROGRAM 
While there are ways to further strengthen the legal framework, there is a 
strong basis for tribal self-regulation of health care in existing federal law—and 
good reasons for tribes to take advantage. Indeed, Indian tribes are beginning to 
implement self-regulation of health care services, through the exercise of inher-
ent tribal sovereignty, in new and innovative ways to address pressing health 
concerns that are not adequately addressed through existing federal programs or 
that can be better implemented through tribal authority. In 2016, in a powerful 
example of how tribal self-regulation can be used to address local community 
needs while at the same time driving the evolution of state and federal law, the 
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community became the first tribal community outside 
 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(7), (r), (aa)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2016) (requiring that hospital providers and 
other providers such as physicians and rural health clinics be state licensed for purposes of Medicare 
reimbursement); 42 C.F.R. § 440.10(a)(3)(ii), (iii) (2017) (requiring that hospitals that provide inpatient 
services be state licensed); Id. § 440.20(a)(3)(i), (ii) (requiring that hospitals that provide outpatient ser-
vices be state licensed).  
 194. 25 U.S.C. § 1647a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2016). 
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of Alaska to employ a dental therapist to provide basic oral health services to 
community members under a tribal licensing and regulatory scheme.195  
Dental therapists are primary oral health care professionals who work under 
the general supervision of a licensed dentist to provide basic clinical dental treat-
ment and preventive services. Dental therapists have been providing such ser-
vices within the Indian health care system in Alaska for many years—the Alaska 
dental therapy program is part of the federally-authorized Community Health 
Aide Program, which was initially created in Alaska over 50 years ago to respond 
to poor health status in isolated, rural communities that lacked basic and preven-
tive care,196 and is now operated under specific authority in the IHCIA.197 The 
Alaska Community Health Aide Program includes dental health aide/therapists 
as well as community health aide/practitioners and behavioral health aide/prac-
titioners—all three classes of which are certified by the Alaska Community 
Health Aide Program Certification Board (CHAPCB), a federally authorized and 
created entity charged with maintaining training and practice standards and pol-
icies, as well as certification of training centers and individual health aides, for 
the community health aide program in Alaska.198 In Alaska, there are five levels 
of dental health aides: Primary Dental Health Aide levels 1 and 2, Expanded 
Function Dental Health Aide levels 1 and 2, and dental health aide therapists 
(DHATs).199 The training curriculum for DHATs includes education and practi-
cal experience components and takes three academic years completed over two 
calendar years.200 The scope of practice for each type of dental health aide pro-
vider is different, but depending on their level of certification, dental health aides 
can provide an array of services including diagnosis and treatment; basic hy-
giene; infection control; pediatric services; uncomplicated extractions; planning 
and prevention; radiographs; restorative services; and urgent care, as well as 
clinic management and equipment repair and maintenance.201 The certification 
 
 195. See infra notes 209–211 and accompanying text. 
 196. Sarah Shoffstall-Cone & Mary Williard, Alaska Dental Health Aide Program, INT’L J.  
CIRCUMPOLAR HEALTH 1, 2 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3753165/pdf/IJCH-
72-21198.pdf. 
 197. See 25 U.S.C. § 1616l (Supp. IV 2016) (detailing the Community Health Aide Program).   
 198. See generally Community Health Aid Program Certification Board, ALASKA CMTY. HEALTH 
AIDE PROGRAM, http://www.akchap.org/html/chapcb.html (last visited July 19, 2018) (displaying the ser-
vices provided by the Alaska Community Health Aide Program).  
 199. See COMMUNITY HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM CERTIFICATION BOARD: STANDARDS AND 
PROCEDURES, § 1.20.010(16) (2018), http://www.akchap.org/resources/chap_li-
brary/CHAPCB_Documents/CHAPCB_Standards_Procedures_Amended_2018-01-25.pdf.  
 200. See id. §§ 2.30.600–2.30.610 (listing the dental health aide therapist educational and supervision 
requirements).  
 201. See id. §§ 2.20.120–2.40.500 (detailing the scope of practice, training and education requirements 
for various provider qualifications). 
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program operated by the Alaska CHAPCB under the federal community health 
aide program has been held to preempt Alaska state licensure requirements.202 
When the Swinomish Tribe launched its dental therapist program, the state 
of Washington did not allow for dental therapists or midlevel dental health ser-
vices to be provided within the state.203 While federal law, as part of the 2010 
amendment and reauthorization of the IHCIA, authorizes the expansion of the 
Alaska Community Health Aide Program nation-wide, the IHCIA specifically 
excludes DHAT services from such tribal programs unless the tribe or tribal or-
ganization is located in a state (other than Alaska) where DHAT services or mid-
level dental health provider services are authorized under state law.204 The only 
option for the Swinomish Tribe, at that time then, was to implement a dental 
therapist program under its own sovereign authority.  
The Swinomish Tribe saw a clear need for such a program. In announcing 
the employment of the first dental therapist on the Swinomish Reservation, a 
press release from the Tribe stated that “too many Swinomish Tribal members – 
particularly children – [suffer] unnecessarily and potentially [face] life-threaten-
ing conditions because they lack access to dental care[.]”205 The press release 
cited disturbing statistics on oral health in Indian Country: 
Oral health research shows that historical traumas have caused Indians 
to lead the nation in oral disease rates. By age five, 75 percent of 
American Indians and Alaska Natives experience tooth decay. Recent 
Federal statistics for Washington, Oregon and Idaho show that Indian 
children suffer tooth decay at three times the national average. Low-
dentist-to-patient ratios in Indian Country mean that many Indians 
lack access to regular dental treatment and prevention services. Turn-
over among providers in Indian Country interrupts continuity of care 
and inhibits the delivery of culturally competent services.206 
 
 202. Alaska Dental Soc’y v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, No. 3:06-cv-00039 JWS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44263 at *12–14 (D. Alaska June 28, 2006).  
 203. See Julie Ralston Aoki et al., Maximizing Community Voices to Address Health Inequities: How 
the Law Hinders and Helps, 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 11, 12–13 (2017) (discussing the decision by the 
Swinomish Tribe to act in the absence of Washington law authorizing DHATs). 
 204. See 25 U.S.C. § 1616l(d)(3) (Supp. IV 2016) (highlighting the rule for electing an Indian tribe or 
tribal organization).  
 205. Press Release, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty., Swinomish Become First Tribe in Lower 48 to 
Use Dental Therapists to Address Oral Health Crisis in Indian Country (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/media/49613/20160104-pressrelease-swinomishhirefirstdentalhealthai-
detherapist.pdf.   
 206. See id. (citing KATHY R. PHIPPS & TIMOTHY L. RICKS, THE ORAL HEALTH OF AMERICAN INDIAN 
AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AGED 1-5 YEARS: RESULTS OF THE 2014 IHS ORAL HEALTH SURVEY 
1–2, 5 (Indian Health Serv., Div. of Oral Health 2015), https://www.ihs.gov/doh/docu-
ments/IHS_Data_Brief_1-5_Year-Old.pdf.  
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The Tribe’s Chairman said of the dental therapist program, “We have developed 
a tribal approach to solve a tribal issue. This solution will help our people imme-
diately address their oral health needs in ways that have not been possible until 
today.”207 
The Swinomish Tribe’s dental therapist program was patterned after the 
Alaska Area DHAT program and designed to improve access to quality dental 
health services within the Tribe’s community.208 The Tribe enacted its own den-
tal provider licensure code that establishes a Dental Health Provider Licensing 
Board and sets the Tribe’s own dental health provider licensing qualifications 
and standards that must be met in order to obtain and maintain a tribal license, 
not only for tribally-hired DHATs, but other of the Tribe’s dental providers as 
well, such as its dentists and dental hygienists.209 The Swinomish Dental Health 
Provider Licensing Code not only covers qualifications and standards for licen-
sure, but also addresses continuing education requirements; discipline, suspen-
sion and revocation of the licenses; enforcement of the Licensing Board’s deci-
sions; and the right of licensees to appeal the denial of a license application or 
disciplinary action to the Swinomish Tribal Court and Swinomish Tribal Court 
of Appeals.210  
The Tribe created the Swinomish Dental Health Provider Licensing Code 
under the authority of the Tribe’s constitution and bylaws, its inherent tribal sov-
ereign authority as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and the rights reserved to 
the Tribe in the “Treaty of Point Elliott.”211 In adopting the code, the Tribe made 
several findings, not only about the Tribe’s sovereign “right and responsibility 
to promote, protect and improve the health and welfare of its members, and to 
enhance the quality of the lives of all of its members by providing a combination 
of economic opportunities and a safety net of social services,”212 but also based 
on documentary evidence of the poor quality of dental health among native chil-
dren and adults and the significant dental health improvements made in Alaska 
under the Alaska DHAT program.213 Moreover, it was important to the Tribe that 
the Tribe’s own dental clinic “provide the highest quality dental services in the 
 
 207. Id; see also Aoki et al., supra note 203, at 13 (describing benefits realized since implementation 
of the Swinomish DHAT program, including decreased patient wait times and the ability of all levels of 
dental providers within the Tribe’s program “to focus their skills and expertise more efficiently – to work 
at the top of their licenses.”).  
 208. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND 
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.040(G)–(J), (N), (Q) (2017). 
 209. Id. §§ 15-11.070, 15-11.100. 
 210. Id. §§ 15-11.070 to 15-11.360.   
 211. Id. § 15-11.030.   
 212. Id. § 15-11.040(A).   
 213. See id. § 15-11.040(C)–(F), (H)–(I) (highlighting the success ANTHC has experienced through 
the implementation of their DHAT program).   
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most culturally competent manner[.]”214 To that end, all dental health aides, den-
tists, dental hygienists, and dental therapists licensed by the Tribe must demon-
strate that they possess “formal education, training, and/or personal or profes-
sional experience that would be reasonably expected to result in cultural 
competency.”215 This provision, which reflects uniquely tribal priorities and has 
no parallel in state licensing requirements, serves to ensure that providers prac-
ticing in the tribal community are meeting tribal needs. Since 2015, the Swinom-
ish Division of Licensing has licensed dental health providers practicing at the 
Swinomish Dental Clinic, and in 2016, the Division licensed its first certified 
DHAT who is now providing services at the Tribe’s clinic and within its com-
munity.216  
The Tribe also adopted a tribal tort claims code to govern procedures for 
individuals who may be injured by tortious acts or omissions of the Tribe, its 
officers or employees in carrying out the scope of their duties or employment, 
and to seek compensation for the injury.217 The Tribe’s Tort Claims Code pro-
vides for a limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for anyone who believes 
they are injured by the Tribe’s licensed dental providers (or otherwise by tribal 
officers, employees or agents, including tribal police officers) to file a claim for 
monetary damages in tribal court.218 The Tort Claims Code limits monetary dam-
ages to the amount of funds available through the Tribe’s insurance coverage.219  
The broad scope of the Tribe’s Dental Health Provider Licensing Code and 
its Tort Claims Code was driven in part by the need to substitute for non-existent 
state law, to help head-off and minimize potential risk that the Tribe’s state-li-
censed dentists would be accused of conducting the unlawful practice of dentis-
try and violating their dental licenses by supervising otherwise un-licensed 
DHATs. As it turned out, the Swinomish Tribe was simply ahead of the curve in 
the development of state law: as of July 23, 2017, Washington Substitute Senate 
Bill 5079 authorizes DHAT services as part of on-reservation tribal health pro-
grams within Washington State. Under this Washington law, DHAT services 
must be provided by a person who is “certified” as a DHAT by a federal com-
munity health aide certification board (i.e., the CHAPCB) or by “[a] federally 
recognized Indian tribe that has adopted certification standards that meet or ex-
ceed the requirements of a federal community health aide program certification 
 
 214. Id. § 15-11.040(N).   
 215. Id. §§ 15-11.150(G), 15-11.160(C), 15-170(C), 15-11.171(B).  
 216. Id. § 15-11.040(O)–(P). 
 217. See generally SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY TORT CLAIMS CODE tit. 03, ch. 08 
(2015).   
 218. Id. § 3-08.060(A). 
 219. Id. § 3-08.060(D).   
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board.”220 The Swinomish Tribe’s dental licensure program, which was already 
tribally designed to “meet or exceed” the CHAPCB certification requirements, 
is thus now also expressly consistent with the authorized certification of DHATs 
under Washington State law.  
As a result of the success of Swinomish’s new DHAT program and the au-
thorization of DHAT services in Washington and other states,221 other tribal 
health programs have expressed a desire to hire, train and certify DHATs to work 
for their own tribal health programs—many such individuals have been hired and 
are currently undergoing the two-year DHAT training program in Alaska.222 
However, not all of these tribes have been interested in developing and replicat-
ing the same comprehensive certification scheme put into place by Swinomish, 
as that could be resource intensive and cost prohibitive, create delays in being 
able to hire DHATs to begin providing services as quickly as possible, and create 
an environment for overlapping infrastructure and inconsistent regional imple-
mentation. Instead, some of these tribes are considering a different way of exer-
cising their sovereign authority to self-regulate, by entering into intergovernmen-
tal agreements with the Swinomish Tribe pursuant to which the Swinomish 
Tribe’s certification program will serve as a region-wide certifying entity for all 
tribal DHATs within Indian country in the states of Oregon and Washington, for 
any such tribes who choose to have their DHATs licensed by Swinomish.223 Li-
censed DHATs may then carry out DHAT services within the tribal dental pro-
gram that employs them, consistent with the Swinomish licenses.224  
 
 220. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.350.020 (2017).  The law also requires that all of the DHAT services be 
performed as part of an Indian health program within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and be 
provided in accordance with the certification standards and pursuant to any applicable written standing 
orders by a supervising dentist.  Id. Under the Washington law, the DHAT services may be provided only 
to members of federally recognized tribes or anyone else who is “eligible for services under Indian health 
service criteria” pursuant to the IHCIA.  Id. 
221. The state of Oregon has also approved an “Oregon Tribes Dental Health Aide Therapist Pilot Pro-
ject,” which is authorized through 2021. ORE. HEALTH AUTH. CTR. FOR PREVENTION & HEALTH 
PROMOTION, DENTAL PILOT PROJECT PROGRAM, DENTAL PILOT PROJECT #100, OREGON TRIBES DENTAL 
HEALTH AIDE THERAPIST PILOT PROJECT (2017), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/PreventionWell-
ness/oralhealth/DentalPilotProjects/Documents/100-abstract.pdf. 
 222. Id. at 4; DHAT Attracts Lower 48 Trainees, RASMUSON FOUND. (July 28, 2015), www.ras-
muson.org/news/dhat-attracts-lower-48-trainees/.  
 223. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND 
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.020 (2017) (indicating that the purpose of this code is to “regulate dental health 
providers to protect the health, safety and welfare of the Tribe and its members, as well as the health, 
safety and welfare of tribal members of other federally recognized tribes in Washington and Oregon whose 
dental health providers are licensed by the Tribe under this chapter[.]”).  
 224. Native Dental Therapy Initiative, NW. PORTLAND AREA INDIAN HEALTH BD., 
http://www.npaihb.org/dhat-news-item-goes-here/ (last visited July 9, 2018).  This approach is compara-
ble in many ways to efforts by states to streamline multi-state licensure for medical professionals through 
interstate compacts adopted and implemented through state legislation.  See, e.g., States Enact Interstate 
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To implement this arrangement, the Swinomish Dental Health Provider Li-
censing Code now authorizes the Tribe’s Division of Licensing and Dental 
Health Provider Licensing Board to license, oversee and discipline DHATs and 
other dental providers who are licensed by the Tribe but employed by other den-
tal health programs of federally recognized tribes in Washington and Oregon 
state.225 Under the Code, the dental provider must be an employee of a compre-
hensive tribal dental health program, and the tribe in question must enter into a 
Memorandum of Agreement with the Swinomish Tribe agreeing to the Swinom-
ish Tribe’s oversight and disciplinary authority over the providers it licenses.226 
Licensees and their tribal employers must submit to the Swinomish Tribe’s li-
censing-related authorities, including agreeing to comply with the Swinomish 
Dental Health Provider Licensing Code and, specifically, with the authority of 
the Swinomish Tribal Court and the Swinomish Tribal Court of Appeals.227 
Tribes who wish to have their dental providers licensed by Swinomish must have 
their own tribal law in place prohibiting anyone from providing services as a 
DHAT without a valid license, and requiring licenses to be maintained in good 
standing.228 DHATs licensed by Swinomish and employed by other tribal pro-
grams must “provide only certain dental services in accordance with his or her 
Swinomish license and applicable state law, and will be supervised by a licensed 
dentist who . . . will provide the other, higher levels of dental care to the tribe’s 
patients.”229   
This exercise of inherent tribal sovereign authority among tribal govern-
ments has a strong potential for creating greater efficiency through consolidation 
of resources and expertise available to all tribes; consistency in implementation 
of DHAT programs throughout the region leading to better cooperation, identi-
fication and implementation of best practices; and reciprocity among different 
tribal programs. And now, this approach—shaped by tribes seeking to use their 
sovereign authority in a creative manner to effectively and efficiently address 
tribal needs—is supported by Washington State law, which recognizes that cer-
tification of DHATs for practice at tribal health programs can be carried out by 
a federally recognized Indian tribe that has adopted the appropriate certification 
standards. In this way, the exercise of tribal self-regulation in this instance has 
served not only to increase and improve services for tribal people throughout the 
region, but to drive advancements in state law as well.  
 
Medical Licensure Compact and Trigger Commission, AM. DENTAL EDUC. ASS’N  (June 10, 2015), 
http://www.adea.org/Blog.aspx?id=27399&blogid=20132. 
 225. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND 
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.370 (2017). 
 226. Id. §§ 15-11.370, 15-11.410.   
 227. Id. § 15-11.370(A), (B)(1). 
 228. Id. § 15-11.370(B)(4). 
 229. Id. § 15-11.370(B)(7). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Existing federal programs and state laws regulating the health care field do 
not always meet local tribal needs. Where possible under the existing legal 
framework, tribal self-regulation of health care programs and services on tribal 
lands can offer solutions to fill the gaps, resulting in better health outcomes in 
local tribal communities while also developing and exercising tribal governing 
capacity. At the same time, tribal self-regulation can benefit non-Indian commu-
nities by driving innovation in health care policy at the state and federal level 
and, in some cases, increasing the availability of services even to non-Indians at 
the local level.   
This process is already underway in some tribal communities, like Swinom-
ish and other tribes in the Northwest implementing DHAT programs and services 
to address their dental health needs. Undoubtedly, tribes will increasingly opt to 
follow this path as they outgrow the existing self-determination model of tribal 
implementation of federal health care programs and services, relying to an even 
greater degree on inherent tribal authority as well as tribal expertise and creative 
problem-solving abilities to improve access to quality health care for Indian peo-
ple. Support for these tribally driven efforts is consistent with the federal trust 
responsibility and government-to-government relationship underlying modern 
federal Indian law, and—most importantly—shows great promise for improving 
the health and wellbeing of tribal communities.  
 
